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The Extraterritorial Application of Federal
Criminal Statutes: Analytical Roadmap,
Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for
Direction
JULIE ROSE O'SULLIVAN*
Under what circumstances can crimes that cross national boundaries
be prosecuted in federal court? This question is critical given the
increasing frequency with which criminal conduct crosses borders. This
Article provides a guide through extant extraterritoriality analysis-
warts and all-and then considers what the answer should be.
First, this Article provides a step-by-step roadmap for those seeking
to answer the questions of where a crime that spans borders was commit-
ted and, if it is deemed to have been committed outside the territory of
the United States, whether the applicable statute and Constitution
would countenance such a prosecution. This roadmap will reveal the
myriad uncertainties and questions that confront courts daily. This
Article resolves two of these doctrinal uncertainties: the continuing
relevance of the Charming Betsy canon of construction and United
States v. Bowman. Courts frequently invoke the Charming Betsy canon
of construction to resolve extraterritoriality questions, but that canon
is no longer relevant given the Supreme Court's latest cases. In those
cases, the Supreme Court has applied a strong presumption against the
extraterritorial application of federal statutes to conduct occurring out-
side the United States. Federal courts, however, rarely apply this pre-
sumption in criminal cases, instead regularly relying on a 1922
Supreme Court case, United States v. Bowman, to hold that federal
criminal statutes have extraterritorial reach. But Bowman, given
recent developments and viewed in light of the history of the Court's
presumption, is an anachronism.
Second, this Article rebuts the near universal conclusion, reached
by both courts and commentators, that extraterritoriality analysis should
be the same in civil and criminal cases. Fundamental separation of
powers considerations and criminal law's foundational legality principle
require that Congress, not courts, clearly and prospectively specify the
content of criminal prohibitions. If there is ambiguity regarding whether
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a statute applies extraterritorially and in what circumstances, the opera-
tional arms of the legality principle, the rule of lenity, and (perhaps)
the vagueness doctrine, demand that this ambiguity be resolved
in favor of the defendant. In short, where a criminal statute is geoambig-
uous, a strong presumption against extraterritoriality ought to apply.
These same principles do not apply in civil cases, and the rationales for
the strong modern presumption that federal civil statutes do not apply to
conduct beyond the boundaries of the United States advanced by the
Supreme Court and scholars are not convincing.
The current state of affairs-in which courts apply a strong pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in civil cases but decline to do so in
criminal cases-is, in short, profoundly wrong-headed. Congress ought
to act promptly to enact a general provision that provides uniform guid-
ance on these questions in criminal matters.
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent "WannaCry" malware attack, the perpetrators penetrated com-
puter systems across the globe and threatened to block access to critical data
unless a ransom was paid. This type of ransomware attack is illegal in most coun-
tries (referred to as States). But where was the crime committed? In the State in
which the perpetrators released their malignant code? Where the violated com-
puters' servers were? Or perhaps where the actual and intended effect of the crim-
inal activity was felt-for example, in Great Britain, where the malware crippled
the National Health Service? If the crime was not deemed to have been commit-
ted in the United States but federal prosecutors still wish to prosecute the miscre-
ants because a few U.S. companies were victimized, they may face a number of
legal objections common in such extraterritorial prosecutions. Defendants may
argue, for example, that Congress does not have the Article I power to regulate
overseas conduct in this context, that Congress did not intend the applicable com-
puter crime statute to apply extraterritorially, and that the Due Process Clause
prohibits this type of prosecution.
With the explosion in cross-border criminality made possible by modem tech-
nology and transportation systems, the globalization of commerce and finance,
and the Internet, these are issues that courts attempt to answer on a daily basis.
But thousands of federal crimes were enacted before these circumstances con-
spired to make criminality increasingly transnational, and thus the statutes say
nothing about their geographical scope. Courts struggle to determine whether to
apply federal statutes to trans-border criminal activity because "[t]he case law is
so riddled with inconsistencies and exceptions." 2 "[T]he only thing courts and
scholars seem to agree on is that the law in this area is a mess."3 The objectives of
this Article are twofold: to provide a guide through extant extraterritoriality
1. See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes
as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648-49 (2006) (estimating that as many as 300,000
federal crimes may have been on the books in the mid-1990s). My focus is on federal criminal law, but
the Supreme Court has held that U.S. states may regulate extraterritorially on the same terms as the
federal government, at least where the state has a legitimate interest and its laws do not conflict with acts
of Congress. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941). The geographic scope of state criminal
statutes is a question of state law, absent preemption issues. In resolving such questions, some U.S. state
courts apply a presumption against extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Glob. Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas Ltd.,
969 N.E.2d 187, 195 (N.Y. 2012). A comprehensive analysis of state practice is beyond the scope of this
Article.
2. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1028
(2011); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 507 (1997); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 89-90 (1998); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 351-52, 396 (2010); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial
Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and
Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 752 (1995); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth
Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1460-61 (2008); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 598, 599-601 (1990).
3. Colangelo, supra note 2, at 1028.
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analysis in criminal cases-warts and all-and to consider what the analysis
should be.
First, this Article seeks to provide that which others have not: a step-by-step
roadmap for extraterritoriality analysis. My aim is to lay out the sequential analyt-
ical questions that courts encounter in cases that have transnational elements. In
aid of this mission, Part I will introduce readers to the international law that con-
trols prescriptive (legislative) jurisdiction. These customary international law
principles answer the basic question of when State A has the authority to extend
the reach of its criminal law to conduct by nationals or non-nationals that occurs,
in whole or in part, outside the territory of State A. United States courts currently
recognize five principles justifying prescriptive jurisdiction: territoriality (subjec-
tive and objective), nationality, passive personality, protective, and universal ju-
risdiction.4 Subjective territorial jurisdiction permits a State to sanction conduct
committed on its territory whereas objective territorial (or effects) jurisdiction
justifies prosecutions where some or all of the objectionable conduct takes place
overseas, but substantial detrimental effects of that conduct are felt within the ter-
ritory of the prosecuting State. Nationality jurisdiction authorizes application of
criminal sanctions to the actions abroad of a State's nationals, whereas passive
personality jurisdiction permits, at least in some cases, a State to sanction a non-
national's conduct abroad that victimizes one of the State's nationals. Protective
jurisdiction may be exercised by a State to prosecute conduct abroad that threat-
ens the security of the State or other vital State interests. Universal jurisdiction
permits a State to criminalize conduct abroad by non-nationals victimizing non-
nationals that does not affect vital State interests if the crime is viewed by the
international community as of universal concern (such as piracy or genocide). An
understanding of these principles is necessary to follow the proffered general ana-
lytical roadmap in Part III as well as the schema in criminal cases in Part IV.
Part II will conclude these introductory materials with an attempt to synthesize,
to the extent possible, the Supreme Court's cases to date. I approach this task
with trepidation because these decisions are undeniably contradictory. But refer-
ence to the Court's historical treatment of extraterritoriality questions is neces-
sary to understand the doctrinal uncertainties that modern courts encounter in
transnational cases, as well as to resolve some of the open issues. This Article
makes the case that foundational principles of criminal law require that extraterri-
toriality questions be treated differently in civil and criminal cases. My review of
the case law, then, will focus in particular on the Court's criminal precedents.
With this context, this Article will then trace the sequential analytical steps
that courts follow in attempting to determine whether a criminal statute ought to
apply in a case that involves transnational activity. The analytical roadmap will
reveal many open questions. One article cannot effectively resolve all of these
questions, but two important issues will be addressed within. Specifically, I argue
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987) (identifying bases for prescriptive jurisdiction).
2018] 1025
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
in sections III.D and IV.A that courts are wrong to continue to invoke the
Charming Betsy canon of construction' and that they would be wise to limit their
reliance on United States v. Bowman.6
The federal courts generally apply two canons of construction to determine the
geographic scope of a statute that, on its face, does not address the question (a
geoambiguous statute): a presumption against extraterritoriality, which the
Supreme Court introduced in its current form in 1991's EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco),7 and the Charming Betsy canon, which the Court
often relied upon prior to Aramco. In the Court's last three extraterritoriality
cases-Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,' Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,9 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Communityo-it empha-
sized the importance of a strong presumption against extraterritoriality. This pre-
sumption has become something approaching a clear statement rule (although the
Court disclaims this reality"): "When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none." 12 The presumption applies "regardless of
whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers
jurisdiction."13 The presumption against extraterritoriality means that the Court
assumes that Congress intends its statutes to apply only to conduct within the ter-
ritory of the United States unless it says otherwise. This exclusive emphasis on
conduct within the territory of a State reflects the subjective territorial principle
under the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction.
The Charming Betsy canon provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."14 Congress has the power to dictate that its statutes apply beyond the
bounds of international law's prescriptive principles, but before 1991 the
Supreme Court often applied the Charming Betsy canon, with reference to all of
international law's prescriptive principles-not just subjective territoriality-to
discern the scope of statutes that were geoambiguous. So, for example, even if a
defendant did not act in United States territory, the extraterritorial application of
a U.S. statute could be justified by the U.S. citizenship of the defendant under the
nationality principle of prescriptive jurisdiction.
These two canons operate from different baselines and thus can provide differ-
ent answers regarding the scope of a geoambiguous statute. The presumption
says "no" to the application of federal statutes to conduct outside of the territorial
United States unless affirmative evidence of congressional intent is supplied. By
5. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
6. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
7. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
8. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
9. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
10. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
11. See infra note 140.
12. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
13. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
14. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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contrast, the Charming Betsy canon applies only where the Court wishes to say
"yes" to a statute's extraterritorial application based on a statutory analysis unaf-
fected by any presumption, but also seeks to ensure that such an application does
not violate international law.
In applying these two canons, courts do not explain the relationship between
them or justify their concurrent use. I argue that courts are likely incorrect in con-
tinuing to apply the Charming Betsy canon to test statutory extraterritoriality. As
my historical survey will demonstrate, the modern Court's presumption is itself a
return to early nineteenth century applications of the Charming Betsy canon.
Because subjective territoriality at that time was the foremost principle upon
which congressional enactments were justified, the Charming Betsy canon looked
a lot like a presumption against extra(subjective)territoriality. That changed over
the ensuing century, but in 1991 the Aramco Court inexplicably chose to return to
this earlier and outmoded analysis. In short, the modem presumption against any-
thing but subjective territoriality is a perversion of the Court's Charming Betsy
canon. The Court's recent cases further demonstrate that the strong presumption
against extraterritoriality has rendered Charming Betsy irrelevant.
The second open question to be addressed by this Article is the status of United
States v. Bowman," a 1922 case that is frequently (ab)used by lower courts to jus-
tify the extraterritorial application of statutes in criminal cases. Despite the mod-
em Supreme Court's strong presumption against extraterritoriality, it is relatively
rare for courts of appeals to find that a federal criminal statute does not have
extraterritorial purchase.16 The Second Circuit has twice asserted that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality does not apply in criminal cases, citing
Bowman, although a subsequent panel of the court attempted to walk back that
assertion.8 My conclusion is that federal courts rely on Bowman at their peril
because it was decided using the outdated Charming Betsy canon and because the
Supreme Court's strong presumption means that it is likely to overrule Bowman
at its first opportunity.
My conclusions that the Charming Betsy canon and Bowman are anachronisms
are not normative in nature. They are simply the best guesses of an experienced
litigator based on history and recent precedents. But the second aim of this
Article is normative: To test the wisdom of the modem Court's strong-and,
indeed, usually case-determinative-presumption against extraterritoriality. In
Part II, we will discover that the Supreme Court's current presumption has a ques-
tionable precedential pedigree. Further, the rationales advanced for the
15. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
16. See infra notes 277-94 and accompanying text.
17. See United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The ordinary presumption that
laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes."); United States v. Al Kassar,
660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) ("The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply
extraterritorially does not apply to criminal statutes.") (internal citation omitted).
18. See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[N]o plausible interpretation of
Bowman" supports the government's assertion that the presumption does not apply in criminal cases;
"fairly read, Bowman stands for quite the opposite.").
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application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in civil cases are weak,
which I will demonstrate by reference to the justifications asserted in the Court's
cases and the scholarly literature in Part V.19
Part VI offers my contribution to this discussion-a rebuttal to the near-univer-
sal conclusion, by courts and commentators, that extraterritoriality analysis
should be the same in civil and criminal cases. Fundamental separation of powers
considerations and criminal law's foundational legality principle require that
Congress, not courts, clearly and prospectively specify the content of criminal
prohibitions. The Supreme Court has decreed that the issue of extraterritoriality
goes to the merits of a case, not to courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. Where there
is ambiguity regarding this element-that is, whether a statute applies extraterri-
torially and in what circumstances-the operational arms of the legality principle,
the rule of lenity, and (perhaps) the vagueness doctrine demand that this ambigu-
ity be resolved in favor of the defendant. In short, where a criminal statute is geo-
ambiguous, it should not be construed to apply extraterritorially. The Supreme
Court has not had full briefing and argument on the issue of extraterritoriality in a
criminal case in the post-Aramco period, and thus has not been forced to consider
the applicability of the rule of lenity and the vagueness doctrine. 20 The lower
courts, looking for the most part to Bowman for answers in criminal cases, have
ignored this seemingly fundamental and obvious issue.
A rule of strict construction or the vagueness doctrine may not be enough,
however, to satisfy the imperative that Congress specify in advance the scope of
federal criminal statutes. This is because many important statutory schemes are
hybrids, meaning that they are also capable of civil and criminal enforcement.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court held in Morrison that the securities fraud
prohibitions of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193421 and SEC
Rule lOb-5 2 2 do not have extraterritorial application. 23 The Court ruled in RJR
19. See sources cited supra note 2; see also, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial
Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 11, 33-34 (1987); Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121 (2007);
William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARv. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous
Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010); Dan E.
Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S.
Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 338 (2012).
20. Arguably, the Court heard an abbreviated presentation on the extraterritoriality of the wire fraud
statute in Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005). As I will demonstrate within, however,
that decision concerned whether the prosecution at issue was domestic or extraterritorial. Because the
Court concluded that all the elements of the crime occurred in the United States, it did not have to reach
the extraterritorial application of the statute. See infra text accompanying notes 299-308.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (2012).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2017).
23. 561 U.S. 247, 262 (2010).
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Nabisco that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 24
has limited extraterritorial purchase. 25 Both Morrison and RJR Nabisco were civil
cases, yet these statutes are also capable of criminal enforcement. The principle
of legality and the interpretive tools that operationalize it are not generally con-
sulted in civil cases.26 But the question of extraterritoriality ought not turn on the
happenstance of whether a case regarding a hybrid statute's scope arrives before
the Court in a civil or criminal context. The presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, then, should be used when examining both criminal and hybrid statutes as a
means of honoring the legality principle, and as a proxy for the rule of lenity and
the vagueness doctrine, requiring Congress to specify, in advance, the extraterri-
torial scope of a statute that has criminal applications.
This Article's roadmap will demonstrate the degree of uncertainty that attends
extraterritoriality analysis. And it will highlight that courts are applying a pre-
sumption of extraterritoriality where they should not-in civil cases-and that
they are avoiding the presumption where it should apply-in criminal cases.
Scholars and commentators have focused on what the courts have done and
should do, ignoring the power and responsibility Congress has to fix this mess.
Part VII concludes, then, with a plea that Congress take action. Case-by-case liti-
gation over the geographic scope of the myriad federal criminal prohibitions is an
enormous burden on judicial and other resources.2 7 It is also unnecessary.
Congress can, and should, create a general code section that dictates what crimes
apply extraterritorially and under what circumstances.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PRESCRIPTIVE (LEGISLATIVE) JURISDICTION
To begin, readers need an understanding of the international law principles
that control prescriptive (legislative) jurisdiction in criminal cases. 28 The actual
function of these principles is to determine whether the action of a State in pre-
scribing or enforcing its laws gives another State a claim for violation of its
rights.29 Congress has the power under our constitutional structure to pass laws
that exceed the limits of these principles.30 In short, international law's prescrip-
tive principles do not limit the power of Congress. They simply give other States
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012)
25. 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
26. Although perhaps they should be. See infra notes 415, 427-34 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 1, at 648-50.
28. Under international law, a State's power is constrained by three types of jurisdictional rules:
(1) prescriptive jurisdiction, meaning the power "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or
status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order,
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court"; (2) adjudicatory jurisdiction, that
is, the power "to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether
in civil or in criminal proceedings"; and (3) enforcement jurisdiction, or the power "to induce or compel
compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by
use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
29. See infra notes 423-24 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 80.
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a basis for objection if Congress exceeds the prescriptive principles. But interna-
tional law's prescriptive principles are relevant to our present inquiry because, as
is explained within, both of the canons of construction applied to test the extrater-
ritoriality of criminal statutes-the presumption against extraterritoriality and the
Charming Betsy canon-cannot be understood without reference to these
principles.
Customary international law (CIL), 1 as recognized in U.S. courts, presently
identifies five bases for prescriptive jurisdiction.
A. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The most traditional basis for prescriptive jurisdiction is territorial. According
to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (Third Restatement), there
are two varieties of territorial jurisdiction. One, "subjective" territorial jurisdic-
tion, is the bedrock. The other, "objective" territorial or "effects" jurisdiction,
was at one point controversial, but came to be widely accepted at least by the
twentieth century.32
31. Customary international law (CIL), formerly known as the "law of nations," is formed through "a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987). Just how much custom reflects a "general and consistent practice" is often in the eye of the
beholder. Similarly, whether a State is following that practice as a matter of comity rather than out of a
sense of legal obligation can be difficult to divine. Courts around the world can take different views on
what constitutes CIL and there is, of course, no Supreme Court of the World to sort it all out. Thus, when
talking about prescriptive jurisdiction, which arises out of customary international law, I will rely on the
best and most authoritative compilation of the United States' views on the subject, the Third
Restatement, to provide the broad outlines. Note, however, that the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States is currently in the works. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Drafts). I will also refer to
the highly influential Harvard Research Study that produced a Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime. See Codification ofInternational Law: Part II Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29
SUPP. TO AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention]. "Federal and state court decisions
in the United States, as well as most course books and treatises on International Law, have adopted the
Harvard Research designations." Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1110 n.5 (1982) (collecting sources).
32. See, e.g., JOHN BASSETT MOORE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND THE CUTTING CASE
23 (1887) (conceding the effects principle, stating that "[t]he principle that a man who outside of a
country willfully [sic] puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil
is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries"); cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280, 285 (1911) (recognizing, in interstate context, that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power"). The
Permanent Court of International Justice, the precursor to the International Court of Justice, is widely
regarded as having recognized the validity of the objective territoriality principle in the famous Lotus
case from 1927. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. After the Lotus case was
decided, the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognized this basis as well. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). The oft-referenced Harvard Research Study
recognized it in 1935. See Draft Convention, supra note 31, at 480. And the Second Circuit, acting for
the Supreme Court in a case in which the Court could not gather a quorum, found the effects principle to
be "settled law" in 1945. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
("[I]t is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
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The question whether a case is founded on territorial jurisdiction is critical
given our subject matter. As this Article makes clear, an important issue that
courts struggle with in cases that have transnational features is: when do federal
statutes have extraterritorial application? That question only arises, however, if
the violation is deemed to have been committed abroad. If the claim is deemed
territorial, there is no need to address the extraterritorial scope of the relevant
statute.
1. Subjective Territorial Jurisdiction
The Third Restatement provides that a State has jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to "conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory."3 3 This is known as subjective territorial jurisdiction. "It is universally
recognized that States are competent, in general, to punish all crimes committed
within their territory"3-and this principle has long enjoyed the Supreme
Court's full-throated support.35 The Supreme Court's modem presumption
against extraterritoriality is keyed only to the subjective territoriality principle-
that is, to conduct occurring on U.S. soil.3 6
One difficulty in applying this well-established principle is the question of
what, and how much, activity must occur on a State's territory for a crime to be
justified by the subjective territorial principle.37 When all the elements of a crime
occur within one State, that crime is "committed" on its territory. 38 When ele-
ments of the crime occur in different States, however, it is not clear what conduct
is necessary or sufficient to ground a State's assertion of subjective territorial ju-
risdiction. In Morrison, for example, a securities fraud claim was founded on a
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and
these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.").
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added).
34. Draft Convention, supra note 31, at 480.
35. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804); see also The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
36. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (adopting a focus test to
determine what conduct must occur on U.S. soil for a claim to be territorial and rejecting use of effects
principle); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) ("If the conduct
relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible
domestic application ... but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the
case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application... ").
37. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The chronic
difficulty with [determining subjective territoriality in securities cases] has been describing, in
sufficiently precise terms, the sort of conduct occurring in the United States that ought to be adequate to
trigger American regulation of the transaction."); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30-
33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 142 (2d Cir. 2014) ("If domestic
conduct satisfies every essential element to prove a violation of a United States statute that does not
apply extraterritorially, that statute is violated even if some further conduct contributing to the violation
occurred outside the United States."), rev'd on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); see also
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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foreign securities transaction, but the fraud was alleged to have happened, at least
in part, in the United States.3 9 The Court held that subjective territoriality is pres-
ent only where the securities transaction occurred, and it was irrelevant that the
fraud element took place in the United States.40 The issue of whether a crime was
committed within the territory of a State will be discussed further in section III.A.
2. Objective Territorial or "Effects" Jurisdiction
The second type of territorial jurisdiction gives a State prescriptive jurisdiction
over "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory." 4 1 This is known as objective territorial or effects jurisdiction.
Many countries use some form of effects jurisdiction, but there is "disagreement
over what it means and how the test should be applied."4 2 The Third Restatement
cautions that "[c]ontroversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the
United States and others, particularly through competition laws, on the basis of
economic effect in their territory, when the conduct was lawful where carried
out." 4 3
The Third Restatement clearly identifies the effects principle as a type of terri-
torial jurisdiction. The reason for this is best illustrated by a frequently used
example.44 Assume that, in a duel, Smith, standing in Mexico, shoots with intent
to kill Jones, who is on the U.S. side of the border. Jones expires in the United
States. In this case, one element of the crime-firing the fatal shot-happened in
Mexico, but another element-the death of the victim-occurred in the United
States. The "effect" is therefore an element of the crime and suffices to give the
United States territorial jurisdiction.
The highly influential Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
published in 1935, discussed objective territoriality in just such terms: a State has
territorial jurisdiction over crimes commenced abroad but completed or consum-
mated within the State's territory.45 The crime, according to the Convention,
occurs "in part" in the State claiming objective territorial jurisdiction because an
"essential constituent element [was] consummated there." 46 The Restatement
39. 561 U.S. at 251-53.
40. See id. at 266-70.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added).
42. INT'L BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 12 (2009)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the
Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 631, 235-36 (2009) (comparing American and
German systems for determining territoriality).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L L. 257 (1980) (discussing frictions arising from U.S.
application of its economic regulations and laws abroad).
44. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (referring to "the oft-
cited case of the shooting of a bullet across a state line where the state of the shooting as well as of the
state of the hitting may have an interest in imposing its law").
45. Draft Convention, supra note 31, at 487-88.
46. Id. at 495.
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(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Second Restatement)
adopted the same elements-based analysis in 1965. It explained:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory if ... the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent ele-
ments of a crime ... under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.47
As CIL has evolved, modern effects jurisdiction has not required that a "con-
stituent element" of the crime, or that conduct consummating the crime, occur in
the prosecuting State.48 For many years, federal courts found territorial jurisdic-
tion to be present when conduct abroad had pernicious effects on American mar-
kets or American citizens, even if no element of the crime occurred in the United
States.4 9 For example, even if all the conduct that satisfied the elements of an anti-
trust claim occurred overseas, courts might conclude that the violation was terri-
torial because the wrongful cartel behavior affected prices in the U.S. market for
the cartel's products. Again, this was important because where effects jurisdiction
was established and a case was therefore deemed territorial in nature, it was not
necessary to test the extraterritorial application of the relevant statute.
The lower courts' application of the effects principle was criticized as "unpre-
dictable and inconsistent" in part because it was difficult to discern what sorts of
effects were sufficient. 0 Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected the use of an
effects test to discern whether a given case is territorial, meaning that the Court
views a case as territorial in nature only if qualifying conduct occurs on U.S. terri-
tory." Perhaps for this reason, the tentative draft of the Restatement (Fourth) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tentative Draft of the Fourth
Restatement) no longer includes effects as a subset of territorial jurisdiction,
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 1965); see also id. cmt. e. The Second Restatement further explained that if the crime at issue
is not one that is "generally recognized," the conduct and effects must be "constituent elements" and the
effect must be both substantial and the direct and foreseeable result of the conduct. Id. § 18(a) cmt. f.;
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (generally providing for the
"[t]erritorial [a]pplicability" of crimes where "either the conduct which is an element of the offense or
the result which is such an element occurs within [the U.S. state].").
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415
(Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities), § 416 (Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities
Related to Securities) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). For example, courts have upheld jurisdiction to prescribe
based on intended effects, even if no effects were actually felt. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 reporters' note 6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
March 21, 2016).
49. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,257-58 (2010).
50. Id. at 260.
51. Id. at 258-61, 266-70.
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delineating it instead as a discrete jurisdictional basis.52 As a consequence, unless
a case is founded on subjective territoriality-that is, unless the relevant conduct
is found to have been committed on U.S. territory-courts must confront the
question of the statute's extraterritorial application.
B. NATIONALITY (OR ACTIVE PERSONALITY) JURISDICTION
A longstanding basis for jurisdiction concerns nationality. Thus, a State has
prescriptive jurisdiction over "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory."53 This ground of jurisdiction
legitimated States regulating, and punishing, the conduct of their citizens wher-
ever they acted; the citizens, then, are the perpetrators. The rationales for this ba-
sis of jurisdiction include "a state's need to prevent its nationals from engaging in
criminal activity, to prevent its nationals 'from enjoying scandalous impunity,'
difficulty locating the place where an offense was committed, and the need of a
state to protect its international reputation."5 4 "[N]ationality jurisdiction is nor-
mally justified by the theory that the national owes allegiance to the home state
both while at home and while abroad. According to this view, the state provides
its national the benefits of nationality, including protection at home and abroad,
in exchange for the national's obedience."
C. PASSIVE PERSONALITY JURISDICTION
Another basis for jurisdiction that relates to nationality-the passive personal-
ity principle-turns on the nationality of the victim. According to the Third
Restatement, this principle "asserts that a state may apply law-particularly crim-
inal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national
where the victim of the act was its national."56 This basis for jurisdiction has been
controversial in the United States, although it is commonly used in civil law
countries.57 Hence, the Third Restatement provides that this principle has not
52. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201(1)
(b) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, March 21, 2016).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
54. Stigall, supra note 19, at 333 (footnotes omitted); see also Draft Convention, supra note 31, 519-
20; Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United States in Regulating Its Own, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1453, 1469 (2014).
55. Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 68 (1992).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
57. See, e.g., CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 113-7 (Fr.) ("French Criminal law is
applicable to any felony, as well as to any misdemeanour punished by imprisonment, committed by a
French or foreign national outside the territory of the French Republic, where the victim is a French
national at the time the offence took place."). The Second Restatement rejected this prescriptive basis.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2) & cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). The Harvard Research Study asserted that this principle is "the most difficult to
justify in theory." Draft Convention, supra note 31, at 579 (explaining that the passive personality
principle is "more strongly contested than any other type of competence"). To see why, consider a
hypothetical case in which France attempts to prosecute an American who, while in the United States,
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been accepted for ordinary crimes, but "it is increasingly accepted as applied to
terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality, or to assassination[s] of a state's diplomatic representatives or other
officials.""
D. PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION
A State has the prescriptive jurisdiction to address "certain conduct outside its
territory by persons [who are] not its nationals that is directed against the security
of the state or against a limited class of other state interests."59 This "protective
principle" is supposed to be confined to crimes affecting the security of the
State or the integrity of governmental functions,60 involving crimes such as
espionage,6 using false statements to gain admission to the country,62 counter-
feiting the State's currency, and the like. But some U.S. courts have been willing
to aggressively expand the bounds of protective jurisdiction to other crimes, such
as prohibitions against drug trafficking,63 that do not directly threaten the security
of the State or the integrity of its functions.
E. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Finally, "universal jurisdiction" gives a State:
jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recog-
nized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and per-
haps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the [other] bases of juris-
diction ... [are] present.6
engaged in an employment practice "victimizing" a French employee, even if that labor practice was
legal in the United States. Not only would this be seen as an intrusion on U.S. territorial sovereignty, but
it would also raise questions of fair notice and legality: How is a U.S. citizen, acting in the United States,
supposed be on notice that his action may be subject to criminal prosecution in Paris? Furthermore,
given this lack of notice, individuals could hardly be expected to engage in the kind of risk/benefit
analysis that undergirds the deterrence rationale for criminal punishment.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a), (d) (2012) (U.S. may prosecute homicide against a
U.S. national while the national is outside the United States where the offense was "intended to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population"). Some courts have applied this
principle more broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
60. Id. § 402 cmt. f.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197-98 & n.3 (D. Mass. 1985).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Lawrence, 727 F.3d 386, 395 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1108 (11th Cir.
2002); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Romero-Galue, 757
F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1161-63 (9th Cir.
2006); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
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Universal jurisdiction first arose in response to the need to prosecute pirates
and was initially restricted to those cases. More recently, States have used their
universal jurisdiction statutes to attempt to try those who commit heinous crimes
in another State, even where the jurisdictional State's nationals have no involve-
ment, the State's nationals have not been victimized, and the State can claim no
protective interests.6 5
F. LIMITATIONS
Even where one of the bases for jurisdiction described above is present, the
Third Restatement's section 403 provides that a State "may not exercise jurisdic-
tion to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."6 6 The
Third Restatement views this "reasonableness" inquiry as a legal obligation, not
an act of comity. 67 We need not dwell on section 403 for two reasons. First, it is
rarely consulted or employed in criminal cases.68 Even when U.S. courts refer-
ence the rule of reasonableness, "they are markedly disinclined to limit jurisdic-
tion in transnational criminal matters on such grounds. As such, it may fairly be
said that no such rule applies in U.S. law vis-a-vis transnational crime."69
This may be because it is doubtful that U.S. courts have the power to dismiss a
criminal indictment on the ground that international law deems the prosecution
65. See id.; Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323,
324-25 (2001).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
67. See id. § 403(2). Another limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law is
exercised by courts through "comity." See, e.g., Stigall, supra note 19, at 335-36. Comity is "a
traditional diplomatic and international law concept used by States in their dealings with each other.
Short of legal obligation, States respect each other's policy choices and interests in a given case, without
inquiring into the substance of each other's laws." CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 136-37 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Comity is "widely believed to occupy a place between custom
and customary international law." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). Prescriptive comity is defined as "the
respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws." Stigall, supra note 19, at
345 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993)). Prescriptive issues are most
pronounced in the antitrust area. See id. at 341-47, 372-73. Because this limitation is generally not
invoked in criminal cases, it will not be further explored here. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42,
at 168 n.119.
68. Despite reading hundreds of cases assessing the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes, I
have found relatively few cases applying or even referencing section 403 in criminal cases. See, e.g., In
re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 412 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir.
2006); United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 884-85 (C.D. Ill. 2011); cf. United States v.
Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir.
1992). But see United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 800-01 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (declining to
apply section 403 in absence of circuit precedent making it part of an extraterritoriality inquiry). Section
403 is infrequently cited by the Supreme Court and, and when it has been cited, it has only been in civil
cases. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-21 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Stigall, supra note 19, at 338.
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"unreasonable." 7 0 Second, the Tentative Draft of the Fourth Restatement has jet-
tisoned section 403. Instead, the Tentative Draft includes a provision stating that,
"I[a]s a matter of prescriptive comity, U.S. courts may interpret federal statutory
provisions to include other limitations on their applicability." 7 1 This, then, is a
principle of statutory interpretation and does not provide "judicial authority to
decline to apply federal law." 7 2
11. CHARMING BETSY AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY:
HISTORY
A historical survey of the Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence is necessary
to understand the promised analytical roadmap within and to resolve some of the
uncertainties courts currently encounter in following that map. In particular, this
survey provides the foundation for this Article's conclusion that courts of appeals
are likely wrong in continuing to rely on the Charming Betsy canon of construc-
tion7 3 and on United States v. Bowman 74 in criminal cases. A review of the
Court's case law is also relevant to our normative consideration of the Court's
strong presumption against extraterritoriality. This review demonstrates that the
modem presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction has a questionable pedi-
gree and it calls into question a central rationalization for the presumption.
As noted in the introduction, where the statute is ambiguous as to its extraterri-
torial application, lower federal courts generally apply two canons of construc-
tion, at least in civil cases. The first is the presumption against extraterritoriality,
which the Supreme Court first articulated in its modem form in EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco).7 6 In Aramco and subsequent cases, the Court
decreed that unless a statute gives a "'clear indication'"7 7 that Congress intended
it to apply outside the territorial jurisdiction78 of the United States, it does not.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (district court does not have the power to
dismiss an indictment for violation of a court's procedural rule enacted pursuant to the court's
supervisory power); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (district court can
dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury only if it is established that the
violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or there is grave doubt that the
decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of the violation); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.
S. 677, 700 (1900) (customary international law may be referenced where there is no controlling treaty
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("An ... American court cannot refuse to enforce a
law its political branches have already determined is desirable and necessary."); see also Brilmayer,
supra note 19, at 21-22.
71. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, March 10, 2017).
72. Id. cmt. a.
73. See infra notes 263-76 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 277-95 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
76. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
77. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
78. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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Again, it is important to recognize that the presumption against extraterritoriality
assumes that Congress acts only with subjective territoriality in mind and thus
means for statutes to apply only to conduct in U.S. territory, unless it affirma-
tively indicates otherwise.7 9
The second canon of construction lower courts reference is the Charming
Betsy canon, which developed in reliance upon the Court's pre-Aramco case law.
Congress has the power to enact extraterritorial legislation even if that legislation
exceeds the prescriptive jurisdiction authorized by international law. 0 Although
Congress can act in excess of international law, courts are reluctant to impute this
intent to Congress, and so they employ the Charming Betsy canon of construc-
tion.s" In short, when faced with congressional silence, many federal courts will
test the statute against the prescriptive principles of CIL on the assumption that
Congress did not mean to exceed them. 82
79. See supra note 36.
80. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not mention CIL, formerly known as the
law of nations. By its express terms, only the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties are the "supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court, however, accepts that CIL is "part of
our law." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). CL, the Court instructed in The Paquete
Habana, may be referenced "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision." Id. Where a statute authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction in excess of CIL principles,
it controls, whether because of the limited potency of CIL under The Paquete Habana or because the
statute is last-in-time. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as
Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 397-98 (1997); see also Rainey v. United States, 232
U.S. 310, 316 (1914); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005); TMR Energy
Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
81. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (AM. LAW INST.
1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States.").
82. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) ("[T]his Court
ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority
of other nations. This rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law-law that
(we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.") (internal citations omitted); Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Though it clearly has constitutional
authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-
law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe."); United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Lawrence, 727 F.3d 386, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929,
935 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Ayesh, 702 F.3d 162, 166-67 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1233 (11th Cir.
2010); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419,
422 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 967 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1328-29 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1205
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Benitez,
741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. King,
552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1973); Rivard v.
United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Blakesley, supra note 31, at 1109 (examining courts' application of the
Charming Betsy canon in light of prescriptive jurisdiction rules of international law).
1038
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FED. CRIM. STATUTEs
The relationship between the Charming Betsy canon and the presumption is
never explained.83 Courts generally employ both tests without any discussion.
The historical reality is that the presumption against extraterritoriality is itself
best explained simply as a throwback to the era in which the application of the
Charming Betsy canon meant that a statute would survive only if justified by the
subjective territorial principle. As Professor Knox has argued,
For most of U.S. history, the Supreme Court determined the reach of federal
statutes in the light of international law-specifically, the international law of
legislative jurisdiction. In effect, it applied a ... presumption that federal law
does not extend beyond the jurisdictional limits set by international law. This
presumption was an offshoot of the Charming Betsy canon . . . .4
Professor Knox is correct, then, in identifying the original presumption as one
against extrajurisdictionality in which, under Charming Betsy, the Court assumed
that Congress did not intend to extend its laws beyond the limits of the pre-
scriptive jurisdiction recognized under international law. The reason that, in
some early cases, the presumption was perceived to relate only to subjective
territoriality-and not to all of international law's prescriptive principles-
was that the two were perceived to be congruent in early U.S. history.
In the early nineteenth century, international law limitations on a State's extra-
territorial jurisdiction were more stringent and were tied by prevailing notions of
sovereignty largely to subjective territorial jurisdiction. 5 At that time, strict
Westphalian views of sovereignty prevailed. Justice Marshall summarized these
views in the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon: "The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself."86 From this it followed in The Apollon that:
The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so
far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sover-
eignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction. And, however
general and comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws may be,
they must always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon
whom the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction. 7
83. The draft Fourth Restatement currently includes one section that discusses the presumption
against extraterritoriality, RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 203 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, March 10 2017), and one that describes the
Charming Betsy canon, RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 205 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, March 21, 2016), but the relationship between the
two is not explained.
84. Knox, supra note 2, at 352; see also Born, supra note 19, at 1 ("[T]he earliest U.S. judicial
decisions relied on the 'Law of Nations' to define the territorial reach of federal law.").
85. See Knox, supra note 2, at 365; see also Born, supra note 19, at 1.
86. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,136 (1812).
87. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
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In short, during this period subjective territorial jurisdiction was supreme.
Only nationality jurisdiction-at least in some circumstances-and universal
jurisdiction-in the case of pirates-could serve as alternative bases for prescrip-
tive jurisdiction." Accordingly, application of the Charming Betsy canon would
have looked a lot like a presumption against extraterritoriality restricted to the
subjective territorial principle. The case that best illustrates these understandings
is American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,89 a civil antitrust case founded upon
actions taken abroad that were alleged to have been in aid of the defendant seek-
ing a monopoly in its industry.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted that "the gen-
eral and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act was done."90
Holmes acknowledged a crabbed version of nationality jurisdiction, noting that
"[n]o doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that
civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some
relations between their citizens as governed by their own law."91 But he con-
cluded that the territorial limitation posited leads "in case of doubt, to a construc-
tion of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."9 2 In
short, according to the American Banana Court, "[a]ll legislation is prima facie
territorial."93
So strong was the early nineteenth century tie between sovereignty and the
subjective territoriality principle that American Banana and a few subsequent
cases implied that-consistent with existing notions of sovereign prerogatives-
Congress did not have the "power" to extend its legislation beyond territorial lim-
its.9 4 Later cases clarify, however, that the presumption is "a canon of
88. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
reporter's notes 7 & 10 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, March 21, 2016).
89. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
90. Id. at 356.
91. Id. at 355-56.
92. Id. at 357.
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ("Legislation is presumptively
territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction.") (citing Am.
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)); see also N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268
U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 195-96 (1820) ("[I]n
construing [a statute] we should test each case by a reference to the punishing powers of the body that
enacted it. The reasonable presumption is, that the legislature intended to legislate only on cases within
the scope of that power . . ."); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 386-87 (1818) ("[T]he
jurisdiction of a [U.S.] state is co-extensive with its territory; co-extensive with its legislative power.");
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) ("[F]ull and absolute territorial
jurisdiction [is] alike the attribute of every sovereign, and [is] incapable of conferring extra-territorial
power...."); cf. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856) (Congress's Article I power to
enact patent laws "is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of the United
States.").
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construction, or a presumption about a statute's meaning, rather than a limit upon
Congress's power to legislate."9 5
What is important to recognize, however, is that the application of the
Charming Betsy canon changed over time as subjective territoriality lost its privi-
leged status. For much of the twentieth century, the Court continued to assume,
consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, that Congress did not mean to exceed
the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law. But the Court came
to recognize other prescriptive principles that justified the extension of U.S. legis-
lative authority beyond U.S. shores.
For example, the American Banana Court's claim that only subjective juris-
diction was legitimate under international law was a stretch even in 1909.
Certainly, as the American Banana Court was forced to grudgingly acknowl-
edge, nationality jurisdiction was a legitimate basis for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion even at that time. 96 Consistent with this principle, the Court later had no
difficulty applying federal statutes to U.S. citizens or their property abroad
without discussing a presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than rely-
ing on geography, the Court upheld these statutes because they applied to U.S.
nationals. It did so in a couple of tax cases,97 but for present purposes perhaps
the best example is Kawakita v. United States,98 a criminal case. In that deci-
sion, the Court held that the federal criminal treason statute applied extraterri-
torially to a dual Japanese-American citizen who had abused U.S. prisoners of
war in Japan. 99 In addressing the defendant's extraterritoriality objection, the
Court relied on normal principles of interpretation and nowhere referenced any
presumption against extraterritoriality.
After its decision in American Banana, the Court also moved away from an in-
sistence on subjective territorial jurisdiction and toward recognition that legisla-
tion could be applied extraterritorially based on the effects principle. This
evolution was seemingly spurred by a series of antitrust cases involving activity
that spanned borders but that, in each case, clearly resulted from a unitary objec-
tionable scheme and just as clearly had a detrimental effect on U.S. interests. 00
95. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2015); see also Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
96. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 358-59.
97. See, e.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (holding that Congress has the power to tax income
received by a U.S. citizen who was permanently residing in Mexico at the time, and rejecting the claim
that this power is inconsistent with international law because of citizenship); United States v. Bennett,
232 U.S. 299 (1914) (upholding tax on U.S. citizen's foreign-built yacht which was used entirely outside
the limits and territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
98. 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
99. Id. at732-33.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S.
66 (1917); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 231 U.S. 106 (1911). In later cases involving international cartels, the Court made no
reference to extraterritoriality concerns. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Co., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);
United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Con'l T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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The Court's explanations for holding that the Sherman Act applied to conduct
that occurred abroad were often terse and oblique. But in at least two cases
decided shortly after American Banana, the Court signaled that even when the
relevant conduct occurred abroad, the Sherman Act applied if the effects of the
forbidden schemes were felt in the United States.0 1 In neither case did the Court
reference a presumption against extraterritoriality.
Many of the Court's cases relating to extraterritoriality concerned the possible
application of U.S. laws to activity aboard ships. These cases perhaps demon-
strate best that what the Court applied prior to 1991 was a presumption against
extrajurisdictionality (measured, under Charming Betsy, against all the intema-
tional law prescriptive principles) rather than a bare presumption against the
extension of criminal jurisdiction beyond U.S. territory (measured only against
the subjective territorial principle). Exploring these cases is also helpful given
our focus on criminal law because most of the Court's extraterritoriality decisions
regarding the scope of criminal statutes concerned conduct aboard ships.
When faced with cases concerning whether federal statutes applied on ships,
the Court did not rely on a presumption based on the physical location of the
crime-that is, whether the ship upon which the offense was committed was on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of the United States or another State.
Instead, either explicitly or implicitly, the Court relied upon international law
principles governing prescriptive jurisdiction as interpreted and applied in the
maritime context. Under international law, a ship was considered the constructive
territory of the State whose flag it flewl0 2 and thus was "deemed part of the terri-
tory of the country to which she belongs."10 3 Stateless vessels-those not belong-
ing to any nation-were deemed fair game under international law. The
nationality principle also played a lesser-but still important-role in these
decisions.
A. PIRACY CASES
In a series of early opinions (1818-1820), the Court was forced to wrestle with
Congress's definition of piracy on the high seas. In resolving interpretive ques-
tions in these cases, the Court did not apply a presumption against extraterritorial-
ity based on the site of the pirates' conduct-that is, the high seas. Instead, the
piracy statute was construed to apply, consistent with international law, to U.S.-
101. See Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 269; Thomsen, 243 U.S. at 88. The Supreme Court's
increasing willingness to apply statutes abroad when doing so would be consistent with the effects
principle was not restricted to the antitrust arena. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952),
the Court applied the trademark protections of the Lanham Act to a U.S. citizen's infringing conduct in
Mexico. The Court concluded that it was immaterial that the infringing activity happened in Mexico
because its effects were felt in the United States, and a U.S. citizen was the offender. See id. at 288
("[P]etitioner by his 'own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, ... brought about forbidden results within
the United States."') (quoting Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S.
249, 264 (1893); see also United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632 (1818).
103. Rodgers, 150 U.S. at 264. But see Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923).
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flagged vessels and stateless vessels, regardless of their location or the nationality
of their crews. 10 4
B. HIGH SEAS
The Supreme Court also repeatedly upheld indictments for murder and assault
committed by nationals and non-nationals on U.S. vessels on the high seas pursu-
ant to a statute that authorized such prosecutions "upon the high seas or in any
arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular [U.S.] state."10 5 Some cases raised definitional questions, such as
whether a particular case occurred on the "high seas"106 or whether a given body
of water was outside the jurisdiction of any U.S. state.107 in none of those cases
did the Court reference a presumption against extraterritoriality, much less use it
as an interpretive aid. The Court also did not refer to the presumption in uphold-
ing an indictment founded on a murder committed on a guano island in the
Caribbean."os
C. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
A more complicated analysis was necessary when a ship flying the flag of one
State was found within the territorial waters of another State. In those cases, two
States had concurrent territorial jurisdiction under international law. As noted,
ships were treated as the territory of the State whose flag the ship flew. But once
the ship was within the territorial waters over which another State was sovereign,
those aboard had to comply with that sovereign's laws "[f]or undoubtedly every
person who is found within the limits of a Government, whether for temporary
purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws."109
104. In United States v. Klintock, the Supreme Court held that the Act of 1790, outlawing piracy,
applied to persons, whether or not U.S. nationals, "on board of a vessel not at the time belonging to the
subjects of any foreign power, but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and
acknowledging obedience to no government whatever." 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); see also
United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). In Palmer, 16 U.S. at 632, the Court ruled that
the crime of robbery committed by a non-U.S. national on a ship belonging exclusively to non-U.S.
nationals is not "piracy" within the meaning of the statute. A subsequent case, United States v. Holmes,
clarified that the nationality of the wrongdoer was irrelevant; all that mattered was that the crime was
committed on a U.S. ship. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 417 (1820). Congress reacted to Palmer by passing
the Act of 1819 "to make clear that it wished to proscribe not only piratical acts that had a nexus to the
United States, but also piracy as an international offense subject to universal jurisdiction." United States
v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 455 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612
(E.D. Va. 2010)); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 157 (1820) (upholding
Congress's decision to define piracy according to the law of nations).
105. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1894); see also Andersen v. United States, 170
U.S. 481 (1898); United States v. Arwo, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 486 (1873).
106. See Rodgers, 150 U.S. at 253.
107. See United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
108. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
109. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856); see also Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923) ("A merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial limits of
another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter.").
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In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, no mention was made of any presumption
against extraterritoriality. Rather, the Court referenced international law, which
viewed the flag State's laws as controlling matters internal to the ship, while the
laws of the State in whose waters the ship was found controlled matters that
related to the peace and security of the territorial community.1 In Wildenhus's
Case, for example, the Court upheld the conviction of a Belgian national for the
murder of another Belgian aboard a Belgian vessel that was moored at a dock in
the United States.11 The Court concluded that the case involved public disorder
affecting the U.S. community, not solely internal shipboard discipline.1 12
1. U.S. Ships in Foreign Waters
The presumption against extraterritoriality would seem to have particular sali-
ence in cases in which a U.S. ship is found within the territorial waters of a for-
eign nation. Yet the Supreme Court did not apply any presumption in affirming
an indictment for an assault committed on a U.S. vessel within Canadian territo-
rial waters.113 Nor did the Court reference the presumption when it upheld the
conviction of a foreign national who committed a crime on a U.S. ship in a
Japanese harbor.1 14 Most importantly, the Court expressly found the presumption
inapplicable in similar circumstances in United States v. Flores."'
The Flores Court upheld the indictment of a U.S. citizen who murdered
another U.S. citizen on an American vessel while it was docked in the territorial
waters of the Belgian Congo. The federal murder statute applied to offenses
"committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, on board any vessel belonging
in whole or in part to the United States or ... its nationals."116 Because the crime
was committed on board a vessel lying outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
U.S. state and within that of a foreign sovereign, the U.S. court had jurisdiction
only if the crime was deemed to be within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States. The issue, then, was whether jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime cases extended to the punishment of crimes committed on U.S. vessels
while in foreign waters. The defendant argued that a presumption against extra-
territoriality ought to be applied to determine whether Congress intended the stat-
ute's grant of jurisdiction over offenses "within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States" to include offenses committed within the territo-
rial waters of another sovereign.117
110. See, e.g., Rodgers, 150 U.S. at 260; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585-86 (1953);
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
111. 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
112. See id. at 17-18.
113. See Rodgers, 150 U.S. at 252.
114. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (trial before consular court in Japan).
115. 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933).
116. Id. at 145-46.
117. Id. at 146-47.
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The Flores Court acknowledged that "[i]t is true that the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States is in general based on the territorial principle, and criminal
statutes of the United States are not by implication given an extra-territorial
effect." 18 But, citing to international law, it held:
[T]hat principle has never been thought to be applicable to a merchant vessel
which, for purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the sovereignty whose
flag it flies to punish crimes committed upon it, is deemed to be a part of the
territory of that sovereignty, and not to lose that character when in navigable
waters within the territorial limits of another sovereignty.1 1 9
In light of the international law consensus on this principle, the Court was
unwilling to say that the language Congress chose "was not intended to give
effect to it. "120
2. Foreign Ships in U.S. Waters
Perhaps the most interesting cases are those that addressed whether U.S. law
would apply to foreign vessels found within U.S. territorial waters. Given the
Court's early emphasis on subjective territoriality, one would assume that U.S.
law would automatically apply. But in some circumstances, the law of the United
States was held not to apply, either because the Supreme Court reasoned that
international law recognized an exception1 2 1 or because the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to govern the actions of foreign ships in U.S. waters. 12 2
Notable in the latter regard is a series of cases in which the Court was tasked with
determining the applicability of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA) 1 23 to union activity in U.S. ports. The Court, in construing the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the LMRA, referenced international law principles rather
than focusing on subjective territoriality. 124 Such was the sway of international
maritime law in these cases that where the issue was whether a general federal
statute that alleged to regulate the internal workings of a foreign ship was applica-
ble in U.S. territorial waters, the Court required Congress to make a clear state-
ment that the statute applied to the foreign vessels. In the absence of such a
118. Id. at 155.
119. Id. at 155-56.
120. Id. at 157.
121. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145-46 (1812) (ruling that it is "a
principle of public law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their
reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction").
122. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2012).
124. Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1974); Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200 (1970); Incres S.S. Co.
v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24, 27 (1963); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142
(1957).
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statement, the statute was not deemed to apply even in U.S. territorial waters.125
In other words, the Court applied a presumption against territoriality.
D. U.S. STATES' EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THEIR LAWS
A final category of maritime cases concerned various U.S. states' attempts to
apply their laws to their own citizens and ships on the high seas. In deciding these
cases, the Court did not apply a presumption against extraterritoriality based on
the locus of the activity regulated, which would have precluded jurisdiction.
Rather, the Court tested the validity of the statutes against all of the international
law prescriptive principles. It determined that the statutes were justified both by
the nationality principle and by the territoriality principle because, under interna-
tional law, ships are floating bits of the territory of the U.S. state from which they
hail. 126
E. SUMMARY OF 1818-1990 CASES
What conclusions can be drawn from over a century of case law? As noted in
the Introduction, the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality decisions are far from
consistent. For example, the above discussion does not touch on a number of
cases that the Court decided by using conflict-of-law principles rather than the
Charming Betsy canon or a presumption against extraterritoriality. 127 That said,
the Supreme Court referenced a presumption against extraterritoriality in only
five cases prior to the 1990s. 128 In four additional cases, the Court acknowledged
that U.S. law was presumptively territorial but concluded that this presumption
was overcomel29 or otherwise inapplicable.13 0 By my count, between 1818 and
125. In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., a splintered Court ruled that foreign-flagged cruise
ships operating in U.S. waters were subject to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
but ruled that the provision of the ADA requiring barrier removal if "readily achievable" did not apply if
the barrier removal would bring the vessel into noncompliance with the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) or any other international legal obligation. 545 U.S. 119, 137 (2005). The
Spector Court read Benz and McCulloch to hold that, in some circumstances, "a general statute will not
apply to certain aspects of the internal operations of foreign vessels temporarily in United States waters,
absent a clear statement." Id. at 129 (emphasis added). The Court fragmented in determining when the
internal affairs rule ought to control.
126. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77-78 (1941); The Hamilton (Old Dominion S.S. Co. v.
Gilmore), 207 U.S. 398,405 (1907).
127. See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (concluding that the
Court "must apply those principles of choice of law that are consonant" with federal and international
maritime law); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (applying general choice-of-law principles for
maritime tort claims).
128. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1989); United
States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222 (1949); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925); Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195-96
(1918); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993) (citing only Aramco, Foley
Bros., and Amerada Hess Shipping, and Justice Stevens's concurrence in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992)); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing only Foley
Bros. for this "longstanding" principle of interpretation).
129. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952).
130. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922).
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1990, the Court could have relied upon or referenced a presumption against extra-
territoriality in deciding over twenty-five cases, but it did not. 13 1 Indeed, in 1965
the Second Restatement referenced a presumption that "[r]ules of United States
statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state authority, apply only to con-
duct occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United States,
unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." 13 2 Yet in 1987, the Third
Restatement omitted reference to any presumption because the Supreme Court
had not applied it since 1949.133 As was detailed above, in many cases in which
the Court did not apply a presumption against extraterritoriality, it conducted a
Charming Betsy-type inquiry into whether the statute at issue could be construed
to apply extraterritorially, consistent with all international law prescriptive juris-
diction principles.
Most notably for present purposes, in all fifteen criminal cases decided since
1818 in which the criminal conduct did not occur within U.S. territory or territo-
rial waters,134 the Court did not apply a presumption against extraterritoriality.1 35
No presumption was applied in an additional five cases that questioned the scope
or meaning of federal statutes where the crime occurred in United States waters
131. See, e.g., Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522 (1987); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963); Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Romero v. Int'l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S.
138 (1957); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952);
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Cook v.
Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); Andersen v.
United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898); St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894); In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453 (1891); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); United States v. Arwo, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 486
(1873); United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 184 (1820); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United States v. Klintock,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (AM.
LAW INST. 1965).
133. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203
reporter's note 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
134. Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 717; Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 69; United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 145
(1933); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 96 (1922); Andersen, 170 U.S. at 91; St. Clair, 154
U.S. at 145; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 250 (1893); In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 454; Jones,
137 U.S. at 204; Arwo, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 487; Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 413; Furlong, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) at 185; Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 154; Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 150; Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 632.
135. Kawakita, 343 U.S. 717; Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 69; Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); Bowman, 260 U.S.
94; Andersen, 170 U.S. 481; St. Clair, 154 U.S. 134; Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893); In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453; Jones, 137 U.S. 202; Arwo, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 486; Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412; Furlong, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184; Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153; Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144; Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 610.
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or at least partially in the United States.136
F. THE MODERN PRESUMPTION: ARAMCO AND MORRISON
In the early 1990s, the Rehnquist Court abandoned the Court's prior focus on
Charming Betsy and the accompanying reference to all the potential bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction under international law in favor of a focus only on sub-
jective territorial jurisdiction. Since its decision in EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co. (Aramco),1 3 7 the Court has applied this narrowed presumption against
extraterritoriality more broadly than ever before 3 8 and has given the presumption
a greater potency than it formerly claimed.13 9 Indeed, in the Court's most recent
cases, the presumption has become something approaching a clear statement
rule. 140
The Court's first step in reorienting and reinvigorating its extraterritoriality
analysis was taken in Aramco, which concerned the extraterritorial application of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Aramco involved a claim by a U.S. em-
ployee who worked for a U.S. corporation in Saudi Arabia that he had been har-
assed and eventually dismissed based on his race, religion, and national origin.
Recall that the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy
canon can provide very different answers regarding the scope of a geoambiguous
statute. The presumption says "no" to the application of federal statutes to con-
duct outside of the territorial United States unless affirmative evidence of con-
gressional intent is supplied, whereas the Charming Betsy canon applies only
136. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005);
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); United States v.
Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
137. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
138. The presumption originally applied to discern whether statutes regulating conduct applied
extraterritorially. But it has more recently has been applied also to statutes that grant jurisdiction. See
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). The Court applied the presumption to read
narrowly a statute that Congress enacted specifically to overrule a narrowing construction the Court had
earlier given to the patent laws and to extend the reach of existing laws to cover activity abroad. See
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). The Court also has applied the presumption
where the question at issue is not whether a given statute applies extraterritorially but rather the meaning
of a statutory term in the domestic context. See Small, 544 U.S. 385.
139. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 2, at 86 ("What was remarkable about Aramco was not just the fact
that the Court again applied the presumption, but the apparent strength of the presumption it applied.").
140. It is true that the Court has stated that there need not be "an express statement of
extraterritoriality" and that "'context can be consulted as well."' RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,
136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016) (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010)); see
also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (claiming that the presumption is not a clear statement rule that requires
the statute to say "this law applies abroad"). And the "presumption" is not irrebuttable, as is
demonstrated by RJR Nabisco, in which the Court held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., has extraterritorial application where Congress has
made the predicate statutes upon which the RICO case is built extraterritorial. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at
2103. That said, the Morrison Court required that congressional intent to apply a statute extraterritorially
be "clearly expressed," 561 U.S. at 255, and the RJR Nabisco Court subsequently demanded that
Congress "affirmatively and unmistakably instruct[] that the statute" will apply extraterritorially. 136 S.
Ct. at 2100. The Court in RJR Nabisco further indicated that it will be "rare" for a statute that does not
have an express extraterritoriality provision to apply overseas. Id. at 2103.
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where the Court wishes to say "yes" to extraterritorial application based on a stat-
utory analysis unaffected by any presumption, but also wishes to ensure that such
an application does not violate international law. In Aramco, nationality jurisdic-
tion (and passive personality jurisdiction) would have, under international law,
justified the application of Title VII to a U.S. corporation that allegedly discrimi-
nated against a U.S. employee. In at least three prior cases, the Court had held
that nationality alone was a sufficient basis to extend U.S. regulations to citizens
abroad without any reference to a presumption. 141 Had the Court applied the
Charming Betsy canon, then, the claim should have survived. But the Court,
applying a presumption based entirely on the place of the discriminatory conduct
rather that the dictates of international law, determined that the statute should be
read not to apply in foreign countries.
The Rehnquist Court's conversion of the presumption's focus is even more evi-
dent in the maritime context. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,142 the
President had directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting
passengers from Haiti to the United States and to return those passengers to Haiti
without first determining whether they qualified as refugees. The issue was
whether such forced repatriation outside the territorial waters of the United States
violated section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
(INA),143 which generally prohibits the Attorney General from deporting or
returning aliens to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened due
to their race, religion, nationality, or other criteria.
The Court, among other considerations, cited the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality in holding that section 243(h)(1) did not apply to the Coast Guard's
actions on the high seas. 144 In applying the presumption, the Sale Court viewed as
dispositive the fact that the vessel was on the high seas and outside the territorial
waters of the United States despite the fact that the case involving an American
ship. In so doing, the Court simply ignored the fact that it had never before
applied a presumption against extraterritoriality based solely on the ship's loca-
tion. In its many maritime precedents, the Court had instead consulted intema-
tional law to conclude that vessels on the high seas are the constructive territory
of the flag country. In those prior cases, then, the Court had no difficulty conclud-
ing that U.S. law applied on U.S. ships on the high seas. 145 Indeed, the Sale Court
ignored United States v. Flores, in which the Court had expressly found a pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality inapplicable because Congress would have
been aware that U.S. vessels are U.S. territory. 146
141. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
142. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV).
144. See 509 U.S. at 173-74.
145. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
146. See 289 U.S. 137, 155-56, 159 (1933).
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Until the last few years, the post-Aramcol4 7 Court's use of the presumption
was not consistent. Since 1991, the Court has applied the presumption in six
cases.148 But it did not apply the presumption in four cases in which it could have
been relevantl4 9 and found it inapplicable in another."'o Notably, the Court has
consistently chosen not to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in the
antitrust context.1 5 1
Two years after Aramco, the Court decided Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California.15 2 The plaintiffs in that case alleged that both domestic and foreign
defendants violated the Sherman Act by engaging in various conspiracies to
affect the American insurance market. 153 The Court was tasked, inter alia, with
deciding whether to dismiss as improper the claims against London reinsurers
who allegedly conspired to coerce primary insurers in the United States because
the claims were extraterritorial. The Court noted that "[a]lthough the proposition
was perhaps not always free from doubt, it is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States." 1 54 It determined that "such
is the conduct alleged here: that the London reinsurers engaged in unlawful con-
spiracies to affect the market for insurance in the United States and that their
conduct in fact produced substantial effect."1 5 5 The defendants, apparently con-
ceding that the conduct alleged was within the scope of the Sherman Act, 156
argued that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction under the principles
of international comity. Reading those principles very narrowly, the Court
147. See 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
148. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-17 (2013); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255
(2010); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 203-04 (1993); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993); cf. Small v.
United States, 544 U.S. 385, 389 (2005) (although presumption does "not apply directly to this case,"
using it to determine the meaning of a statute in a domestic prosecution).
149. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013); Pasquantino v. United States, 544
U.S. 349 (2005); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
150. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. 764. The Court has not applied the presumption in
such cases after American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). See Cont'l Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Cont'l T.
V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co.,
228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
152. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
153. Id. at 769.
154. Id. at 795-96 (citing Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. 347); see also Cont'1 Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 704
("A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not
outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign
countries.").
155. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796.
156. See id. at 795.
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concluded that no conflict, and thus no necessity for a comity analysis, existed
where a person subject to regulation by two States could comply with the laws of
both. 15 7
In 1982 Congress had passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA), 15 s which excluded from the Sherman Act's reach "conduct involving
trade or commerce ... with foreign nations," other than import trade or import
commerce, unless "such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect" on domestic or import commerce. 15 9 The "FTAIA was intended to
exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the United
States economy."160 The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Court noted that it was
unclear "whether the Act's 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect'
standard amends existing law or merely codifies it."16 1 The FTAIA was not the
basis of the Court's opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. because, the Court
concluded, its application to the case was unclear and, in any event, the conduct
alleged clearly met the FTAIA's requirements. 162
In a subsequent antitrust case, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 163
the Court was forced to apply the FTAIA. The case involved an international car-
tel of vitamin sellers that agreed to fix prices, which led to higher vitamin prices
in the United States and independently led to higher vitamin prices in foreign
States. The Court concluded that a purchaser in the United States could bring a
Sherman Act claim under the FTAIA based on domestic injury, but a purchaser
in a foreign State could not bring a Sherman Act claim based on foreign harm.164
Thus, the Court held, foreign persons could not claim relief for foreign injuries
that were independent of any adverse domestic impact from the cartel. 16 5 In so
doing, the Court referenced the limits of international prescriptive jurisdiction
and applied the Charming Betsy canon in interpreting the FTAIA. 1 66
157. See id. at 799.
158. Pub. L. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A) (2012).
160. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796 n.23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 2-3, 9-10 (1982)
and P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 296-97 (Supp. 1992)).
161. Id.; see also United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2004)
(FTAIA altered the common law "effects" test).
162. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796-97 n.23.
163. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
164. See id. at 159.
165. See id. at 164.
166. Id. at ("[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations. This rule of construction reflects principles of customary
international law-law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow. See Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) ('[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains')." (internal citations omitted)).
Litigants have argued that the Court's latest extraterritoriality cases, and particularly Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), demonstrate the Court's renewed commitment to a
strong presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus that these decisions implicitly overruled Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. and its application of the conduct-and-effects test in antitrust cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding argument waived). Although the
Morrison Court emphatically rejected application of the conduct-and-effects test in the securities area,
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In 2010, the Court strongly signaled that these antitrust cases are sui generis by
insisting on a strong presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank.1 6 7 The case was a blockbuster because the Court over-
ruled decades of courts of appeals case law by dramatically limiting the scope of
the securities fraud laws. The respondent, National Australia Bank (National), a
non-U.S. bank whose shares were not traded on any U.S. exchange, purchased re-
spondent HomeSide Lending, a company headquartered in Florida. 168 A few
years after this purchase, National had to write down the value of Homeside's
assets, causing a drop in National's share price.16 9 Petitioners, Australians who
purchased National's stock before the write-downs, sued National, Homeside,
and officers of both companies in federal district court for violating sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934170 and SEC Rule
lOb-5. 17 1 Petitioners claimed that HomeSide and its officers, with the knowledge
of National and its chief executive, manipulated financial models to make the com-
pany appear more valuable than it was. 17 2 In short, this was a "foreign-cubed" 173
securities fraud case in that the parties were Australian, the shares were not listed
on a U.S. exchange, and the shares were purchased and sold in Australia. The peti-
tioners, however, believed that because the fraudulent conduct took place, at least
in part, in the United States, their civil securities fraud suit belonged in a U.S.
court. 174
The district court dismissed the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction,
concluding that the fraudulent acts alleged in the United States were, "at most, a
link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated
abroad."1 75 The Second Circuit affirmed because the fraudulent acts performed in
the United States did not "compris[e] the heart of the alleged fraud." 17 6 The
Supreme Court reversed, making three critical rulings.
First, until Morrison, 7 all the circuits treated extraterritoriality as a question
going to the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction in securities and other cases. In
Morrison, however, the Supreme Court made clear for the first time that the extra-
territoriality question was not jurisdictional; rather it relates only to whether a
case can be made on the merits. 178 It explained:
the FTAIA's codification of an effects test as applied to export activity may preclude the Court from
revisiting its precedents, at least in that context.
167. See 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
168. Id. at 251.
169. Id. at 252.
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (2012).
171. 561 U.S. at 252-53; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
172. 561 U.S. at 252.
173. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2008).
174. See 561 U.S. at 253.
175. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25 2006).
176. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 175-76.
177. 561 U.S. 247.
178. Id. at 253-54 (citations omitted).
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[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits,
which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, "refers to a
tribunal's 'power to hear a case."' It presents an issue quite separate from the
question whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief. The
District Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate
the question whether § 10(b) applies to National's conduct.179
As we shall see in our roadmap discussion in section III.C, this ruling has im-
portant procedural implications.8 0
Second, the Supreme Court, again overruling decades of lower court precedent,
held that section 10(b) does not apply beyond the shores of the United States after
applying a strong presumption against extraterritoriality. Until Morrison, the cir-
cuits had decided whether they had jurisdiction over securities fraud claims that
involved transnational elements by applying the so-called "conduct-and-effects"
test. This test was derived from international law's understandings of what consti-
tuted a "territorial" application of legislation. It presumed that where subjective
territoriality (domestic conduct) or objective territoriality (domestic effects) were
present, the case was a territorial suit and no issue of statutory extraterritoriality
was raised. The test was pioneered by the Second Circuit and adopted by the
other circuits. The Court emphatically rejected the Second Circuit's conduct-
and-effects test as fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption against
extraterritoriality.s'
The conduct-and-effects test, the Court reasoned, was not based on the text of
the statutes or actual legislative intent, 18 2 but rather on speculation as to what
"Congress would have wanted" had it considered the application of the securities
laws in a given contextl8 and on "matters of policy."1 8 4 The Court also rejected
the conduct-and-effects test as "complex in formulation and unpredictable in
application."" Having rejected the circuit courts' test, the Court applied its pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. It examined the language and history of sec-
tion 10(b) and concluded that there was "no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that section 10(b) applies extraterritorially" and thus nothing to
rebut the presumption.1 8 6 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the securities fraud
provisions at issue did not apply extraterritorially.
The Morrison Court's third and final holding related to the question of when a
given securities fraud case could be deemed extraterritorial, and thus precluded,
as opposed to territorial or domestic, in which case it could proceed. Having lost
the battle of extraterritoriality, the petitioners attempted to win the war by arguing
179. Id. at 254 (citations omitted).
180. See infra notes 238-62 and accompanying text.
181. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
182. Id. at 258, 267 n.9.
183. Id. at 257.
184. Id. at 259.
185. Id. at 256.
186. Id. at 265.
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that they sought only domestic application of section 10(b). Petitioners contended
that, given that the fraud was hatched in Florida and false statements were made
there, the fraud was committed in the United States.
Acknowledging that "it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application
that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States," the Court applied a
"focus" test, which asks what conduct is the "object[] of the statute's solici-
tude."187 This test looks to "those transactions that the statute seeks to 'regulate'
and to the "parties to those transactions that the statute seeks to 'protec[t]."'1 88
The Court reasoned that section 10(b) does not "punish deceptive conduct, but
only deceptive conduct 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered."'189
Thus, the Court concluded that section 10(b) applies "only [to] transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other secur-
ities"19 0 and suggested that all other cases constitute improper extraterritorial
applications of the statute. In other words, unless there was a domestic securities
transaction, the case constitutes a forbidden extraterritorial application of the stat-
ute. The site of the fraud is irrelevant to determining whether a claim is territorial
or extraterritorial in nature.
It should be noted that after Morrison was announced, Congress amended the
jurisdictional provisions of a number of securities laws in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).191 The amend-
ments left Morrison's holding untouched in private civil securities suits. 192 But
with respect to securities fraud cases brought by the SEC and Department of
Justice, the Act provides the government jurisdiction to pursue securities viola-
tions where the "conduct within the United States ... constitutes significant steps
in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside
the United States and involves only foreign investors; or ... conduct occurring
outside the United States ... has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States."193 The amendment thus purports to reinstate a version of the Second
Circuit's conduct-and-effects test. 194
187. 561 U.S. 255 at 266-67.
188. Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 266 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)).
190. Id. at 267.
191. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b)
(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865-66 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010)).
192. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that section
929P(b) applies only to government-initiated claims).
193. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010)).
194. I am hedging slightly because some argue that this provision was not effective in overruling
Morrison in this respect. The question whether this provision was sufficient to overrule Morrison arises
because Congress included its conduct-and-effects test in the Act's subject-matter jurisdiction
provisions. Morrison, however, held that the extraterritorial limitation was a merits question and
Congress did not amend the substantive portions of the statutes. See, e.g., SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr.,
LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909-17 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV.
195, 199-205 (2011).
1054 [Vol. 106:1021
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FED. CRIM. STATUTEs
Despite the actual holding in Morrison appearing to have been overruled in
part by Congress, the Court's analysis has controlled in two subsequent cases.
These additional extraterritoriality cases demonstrate the current Court's renewed
commitment to a strong presumption against extraterritoriality. In Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,195 the Court considered whether the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) confers federal-court jurisdiction over causes of action alleging
international-law violations committed overseas. In that case, Nigerian nationals
residing in the United States sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations pur-
suant to the ATS, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.196 The
Court granted certiorari to decide whether corporations are immune from tort
liability under the ATS for violations of the law of nations.197 The Court itself
raised the extraterritoriality question, asking for supplemental briefing on whether
courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS for violations occurring
within the sovereign territory of another State. 198
The Kiobel Court acknowledged that the presumption against extraterritoriality
is "typically" applied to statutes "regulating conduct," but it determined that the
principles supporting the presumption should "similarly constrain courts consid-
ering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS." 99 Thus, the Court
applied the presumption and held that the ATS statute did not apply extraterritori-
ally because the statute lacked any clear indication that it extended to the sorts of
foreign violations alleged in that case.200
Finally, in 2016, the Court in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community201
addressed the extraterritorial scope of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).202 RICO is a complex statute, but its most common
application involves civil and criminal cases alleging that the defendants con-
ducted an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Such a pattern is
proven by two or more violations of qualifying federal or state statutes.203 The
violations identified are commonly referred to as RICO predicate offenses. The
RJR Nabisco Court held that RICO has extraterritorial application only where
Congress has made the predicate statutes upon which the RICO case is built
extraterritorial. 2 04 RJR Nabisco demonstrates that the modem presumption is not
irrebuttable, but its analysis also underscores how difficult it is to overcome the
presumption.
195. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
196. Id. at 111-12.
197. Id. at 112-13.
198. Id. at 114.
199. Id. at 116.
200. See id. at 118-24.
201. See 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
202. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012).
203. See id. § 1961(1), (5).
204. 136 S. Ct. at 2101-03.
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The Morrison Court required that congressional intent for a statute's extraterri-
torially be "clearly expressed." 205 The RJR Nabisco Court took it up a notch by
requiring that Congress "affirmatively and unmistakably instruct[] that the stat-
ute" will apply extraterritorially. 206 The RJR Nabisco Court found an "obvious
textual clue" in the fact that some RICO predicates, by their express terms, apply
extraterritorially. 207 Indeed, "[a]t least one predicate-the prohibition against
'kill[ing] a national of the United States, while such national is outside the United
States'-applies only to conduct occurring outside the United States."208
Congress's incorporation of extraterritorial predicates into RICO, the Court con-
cluded, "gives a clear, affirmative indication that § 1962 applies to foreign racket-
eering activity." 20 9 Thus, RICO's unique structure made it "the rare statute that
clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of
extraterritoriality. "210
In sum, although the Court's decisions post-Aramco have not been entirely
consistent, its most recent cases demonstrate that the Court is committed to a
muscular presumption against extraterritoriality.
III. ANALYTICAL ROADMAP: GENERAL
Having explored the relevant background principles of international law and
summarized the Court's historical treatment of extraterritoriality questions, we
now turn to the promised analytical roadmap. These sections discuss the sequen-
tial analytical issues that courts must often wrestle with in cases with transna-
tional features.
A. THE "WHERE" QUESTION
The question whether a given statute applies extraterritorially arises only if the
crime is deemed to have occurred abroad. Accordingly, the first logical question
is whether a given crime was committed within the United States or overseas.
Figuring out where a crime was committed for purposes of determining whether
it should be deemed territorial (domestic) or extraterritorial turns out to be a com-
plex question.
The easiest case is one in which the elements of the crime are completed in one
State: that State will clearly have territorial jurisdiction. But when the elements
of the crime occur in two jurisdictions, as in our dueling example, 2 1  do both
States have territorial jurisdiction? In Morrison, the Court decreed that the loca-
tion of only one element of the claim (the securities transaction) was relevant to
determine whether a case is territorial or extraterritorial; it ruled that where
205. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
206. 136 S. Ct. at 2100.
207. Id. at 2101.
208. Id. at 2102 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (2012)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2103.
211. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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another element occurred (the fraud) was immaterial. If some elements are more
important than others in determining the site of a statutory violation, how does
one decide which element ought to be consulted when determining where the vio-
lation occurred?
Finally, as we know, modem effects jurisdiction does not require that a constit-
uent element of the crime occur in the prosecuting State. Should the pernicious
effects of a crime serve as a ground for territorial jurisdiction even when those
effects are not an element of the crime? To give a concrete example, assume for
the moment that it could be proved that a foreign power hacked and released a
presidential candidate's internal campaign communications. Assume further that
it can be proved that this hacking gave the other candidate the victory. (These are
just assumptions for purposes of making a point.) In this hypothetical, the crimi-
nal conduct occurs overseas and has a profound effect on the most important elec-
toral contest in the United States, but proof of damage is not an element of the
computer crime. If the computer crime statute does not apply extraterritorially,
should courts rule that this effect is sufficient to make this a territorial violation?
The circuit courts responded to the "where" question by formulating their con-
duct-and-effects test. A more limiting elements-based test was endorsed by the
Harvard Research Study and the Second Restatement. The Supreme Court
rejected the circuits' test and ignored the elements-based approach in formulating
its more stringent "focus" test for subjective territoriality.
1. Conduct-and-Effects Test
For many years, the lower courts, when faced with a case involving transna-
tional elements, used a conduct-and-effects test to examine whether a claim was
territorial, and thus was cognizable, or extraterritorial, and therefore subject to
dismissal.
To review, the conduct-and-effects test inquired into both conduct and effects
under the subjective and objective territorial principles. Subjective territoriality
turned on conduct within U.S. territory. Objective territoriality focused on the
effects the foreign conduct had within the United States. The effects did not have
to be an element of the crime or cause of action to be cognizable.2 12
This test was pioneered in the Second Circuit during the 1960s in the securities
context and was briefly justified as a means of testing the extraterritorial reach of
a statute.213 In subsequent transnational cases, however, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the securities laws' applicability depended upon whether substantial
fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States or direct harm was suffered by
Americans residing in the United States in the apparent belief that such claims
212. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
213. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing the extraterritorial
application of the Securities and Exchange Act where fraudulent acts were committed outside the
United States based on "effects" jurisdiction).
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were not extraterritorial.214 In so doing, the Second Circuit repeatedly relied on
the Second Restatement, 2 15 approved in 1965, which noted in a section entitled
"Territorial Interpretation of United States Law" that "[r]ules of United States
statutory law ... apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within,
the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated." 2 16 In
other words, the Second Circuit was not engaged in determining whether the ap-
plicable statutes applied extraterritorially; 217 it was instead determining whether a
suit concerned territorial claims, and thus was unobjectionable, as opposed to
extraterritorial claims, which were assumed to be outside the scope of the stat-
21
ute.218 If there were sufficient conduct and effects present to warrant a belief that
"Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and
law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them," the case was deemed domestic
and could proceed.2 19 If, however, sufficient evidence of territoriality (conduct
and effects) was not present, the case would be dismissed. In essence, then, the
Second Circuit was not only applying the presumption against extraterritoriality,
but it was also making that presumption irrebuttable.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court took the Second Circuit to task for applying
the conduct-and-effects test, which it mistakenly viewed as an alternative to the
Court's presumption against extraterritoriality rather than a test for territoriality.
In any case, the Morrison Court emphatically rejected the use of the conduct-and-
214. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972).
215. See, e.g., Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016-17 (referencing SECOND RESTATEMENT'S § 30 (nationality
jurisdiction) and SECOND RESTATEMENT's § 18); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987-88 (referencing SECOND
RESTATEMENT'S § 18 and § 30 (nationality jurisdiction)); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1333-35, 1339
(referencing SECOND RESTATEMENT'S § 18 and § 30 (nationality jurisdiction)).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (AM.
LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
217. Indeed, the word "extraterritorial" is usually not employed in these cases after Schoenbaum.
Rather, the Second Circuit conceived itself as addressing the "recurring theme of the extent to which the
federal securities laws apply to transnational transactions." Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1003-04; see also
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing "transnational"
securities claims).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit
expressly noted that, when dealing with cases involving transnational securities claims, "courts have
employed only the territorial principle," referencing territoriality's subjective and objective "variations
of this principle." Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th Cir. 1979)
(quoting Note, Jason Wambold, The Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the
Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137, 139 & nn.12-16 (1978)). And as the D.C. Circuit explained
in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.:
Because conduct with substantial domestic effects implicates a state's legitimate interest in pro-
tecting its citizens within its borders, Congress's regulation of foreign conduct meeting this
"effects" test is "not an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction." Thus, when a statute is applied to
conduct meeting the effects test, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply.
566 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923).
219. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.
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effects test.2 2 0 It reasoned that the test has no textual support and is difficult to
apply in a principled manner.2 21 The Court made clear that it believes that territor-
iality turns only on domestic conduct and not on effects. In the above-posited po-
litical hacking example, given the magnitude of the domestic effects, the case
could be deemed territorial in nature under a conduct-and-effects test. But after
Morrison, territorial jurisdiction would exist only for the State in which the rele-
vant conduct occurred, and the serious and important effects of the hacking on
the U.S. population would be insufficient to make the case territorial.
2. Elements-Based Approach
The Court's rejection of the conduct-and-effects test meant that it had to forge its
own test for determining where an offense is committed-that is, what conduct
must occur in a State for the crime to be considered domestic as opposed to extrater-
ritorial. One alternative test available to the Court was the elements-based approach
adopted by a 1935 Harvard Research Study and the Second Restatement.222 The ele
ments approach determined that territorial jurisdiction existed based on either con-
duct or effects if the conduct and effects were elements of the crime. Recall that in
Morrison, fraudulent conduct occurred in both Australia and the United States; how-
ever, the relevant securities transactions were conducted in Australia. Had an ele-
ments approach been used, the site of the securities fraud may have justified a
conclusion that the case was territorial in the United States as well as Australia.
This elements-based approach was narrower than the circuits' conduct-and-
effects test because this approach only recognized effects as a foundation for ter-
ritorial jurisdiction when those effects were an element of the claim. In our hack-
ing example, the elements-based approach would mandate that a hacking
prosecution could only be deemed territorial if the government was required to
prove the relevant damage-that is, effects-as an element of the offense. This
test not only had the endorsement of the Harvard Research Study and the Second
Restatement, but it also reflected the common law approach used in criminal
cases.
3. The Morrison "Focus" Test
Instead of adopting either of these approaches, the Morrison Court chose to
create its own "focus" test, which had no precedential support.22 3 Under this focus
220. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,255-61 (2010).
221. See id. at 258-60.
222. For a discussion of the elements test, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
223. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-67. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
255 (1991), the decision the Morrison Court cited to support its "focus" test, never addressed the
question of what would constitute a domestic, as opposed to an extraterritorial, application of Title VII.
The case was argued on the assumption that regulation of employment practices overseas, even those of
United States employers who employ United States citizens, constituted an extraterritorial application of
Title VII. Aramco's discussion of the domestic "focus" of the act, then, simply was used to bolster the
presumption against extraterritoriality and rebut textual arguments against its application. Id. Similarly,
in the other case cited in Morrison, Foley Bros., v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949), the statute at issue
required contractors working pursuant to a government contract to limit workers' hours to eight hours
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test, courts must evaluate what "territorial event" or "relationship" is the "focus"
of the statute to identify the conduct that must occur in the United States for the
suit to be deemed domestic, as opposed to extraterritorial.224 Using its focus test,
the Morrison Court identified one element of the securities claim to be decisive,
ruling that subjective territoriality is only present in civil securities fraud cases
involving "transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities."2 25 Under Morrison's focus test, then, the location
of the allegedly fraudulent activity and the place where the harmful effects are
felt are irrelevant. This approach is more stringent than the elements-based
approach because it privileges the focus element and ignores other elements
(including conduct elements) of the offense.
As applied to other statutes, the focus test may well mean, as it did in
Morrison, that the site of only one element of a multi-element statutory provision
will control the determination of whether the relevant offense was committed in
the United States or abroad. Combined with the presumption against extraterritor-
iality, this approach has the potential to drastically limit the scope of federal crim-
inal prohibitions in transnational cases. The Court's strong presumption is often
case determinative, meaning that, if courts apply the presumption, most federal
crimes will have no extraterritorial application. And if only one element controls
the question of whether a violation is territorial, this may further narrow the scope
of the prohibition. For example, under Morrison (and before the Dodd-Frank
Act), a criminal securities fraud case could only proceed if the securities transac-
tion occurred in the United States, regardless of the location of the fraudulent
conduct.
Although Morrison's focus test was designed to promote predictability and
clear jurisdictional line-drawing, it is unlikely to serve those ends. The test is dif-
ficult to apply because Congress does not normally identify a statutory focus. 2 26
Commentators are rightly concerned that it is therefore manipulable and subjec-
tive.227 For example, the Morrison Court's decision that the location of the secur-
ities transaction is decisive and the site of the fraudulent conduct is irrelevant
seems arbitrary given that the statutory prohibition is against securities fraud-a
per day. The question presented was whether the statute applied to contracts for work abroad. Id. at 284-
85. The Court again assumed that this was an extraterritorial application of the statute, notwithstanding
the fact that the employee seeking overtime pay in the case was an American citizen. The Court applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality and augmented the presumption with a discussion of the
language and history of the statute. Id. at 285-86. At no point did the Court query what might constitute
a domestic versus extraterritorial application of the statute.
224. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-67.
225. Id. at 267.
226. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40
Sw. L. REV. 655, 663-64 (2011); John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 40 Sw. L. REV. 635, 643-45 (2011); Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative
Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 1699-1700 (2012).
227. See, e.g., Richard A. Grossman, The Trouble with Dicta: Morrison v. National Australia Bank
and the Securities Act, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 349 (2013).
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transaction is not covered by the prohibition unless it is accompanied by fraud.
And the result of this ruling is disturbing in that it permits U.S.-based fraudsters
to engage in deceptive practices in the United States, addressed to U.S. citizens
and others, free from civil liability as long as they ensure that the wrongful trans-
actions take place overseas.
Most troubling is that in formulating and applying this focus test, the Court
ignored the fact that Congress had, in the securities fraud venue provision, pro-
vided its answer to the question of where such a violation is committed. As the
Court has explained, "[t]he Constitution makes it clear that determination of
proper venue in a criminal case requires determination of where the crime was
committed."2 28 Congress had, by statute, expressly provided that a criminal secur-
ities fraud is "committed" for venue purposes where "any act or transaction con-
stituting the violation occurred." 229 Presumably "any act" would include acts of
fraud and would not be restricted simply to transactions in securities. This statu-
tory provision provides a much firmer foundation for determining Congress's
intention regarding where actionable domestic conduct was committed than spec-
ulation about statutory focus. I believe that in making territoriality decisions in
criminal cases, courts should be guided by Congress's venue directives rather
than the Court's novel focus test.
Finally, I should note that Congress's post-Morrison amendments to the juris-
dictional provisions of a number of securities laws in the Dodd-Frank Act 230 may
have overruled the Court's application of the focus test in government-initiated
securities suits. Under Dodd-Frank, the SEC and DOJ have jurisdiction to pursue
securities violations where the "conduct within the United States ... constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or ... con-
duct occurring outside the United States ... has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States."231 As noted previously, it is unclear whether courts will
find that this amendment supersedes the Morrison focus test. 23 2
228. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed"); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.. . .").
229. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012).
230. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 929E(b), 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1853, 1865 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010)).
231. Id. § 929P(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
232. See supra note 194.
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B. ARTICLE I CHALLENGES
If a situation is deemed to concern an extraterritorial application of the relevant
statute, sometimes (but not often23 3 ) litigants think to challenge Congress's con-
stitutional power under Article I to reach the targeted overseas conduct. In finding
that Congress does have the power to regulate transnationally, courts often rely
on the foreign or domestic Commerce Clause; 234 Congress's power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the
law of nations; 235 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, when employed by
Congress to implement a treaty that requires States to enact criminal legislation
pursuant to its terms. 23 6
If Congress has the constitutional power to apply a statute to transnational
criminal activities and it has included instructions in the statute regarding its geo-
graphic scope, courts will follow those instructions.23 7 Much more commonly,
however, Congress has provided no such explicit instructions. The inquiry then
becomes whether Congress intended to give the statute extraterritorial effect.
C. THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPROPRIATENESS OF A PROSECUTION IS AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE
If a case is deemed extraterritorial and Congress has the constitutional power
to regulate the relevant overseas activity but the statute is geoambiguous, courts
will attempt to discern whether Congress intended the statute to apply to extrater-
ritorial conduct. One threshold question that must be considered is what proce-
dural consequences flow from an extraterritoriality determination. For decades,
the courts of appeals treated the issue whether a statute had extraterritorial appli-
cation as a question going to the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. If the claim
was deemed extraterritorial, and the relevant statute did not apply extraterritori-
ally, courts would dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds. In Morrison, how-
ever, the Court ruled that, unless Congress specifies otherwise, the question
whether a statute applies extraterritorially does not go to subject-matter jurisdic-
tion but is, instead, a "merits" question. 2 38
This change in approach has significant implications for criminal defendants.
First, questions of jurisdiction are non-waivable and can be raised at any time.
"Merits" determinations, by contrast, are waivable, especially when a defendant
pleads guilty because such pleas waive all non-jurisdictional objections. 2 39 Thus,
233. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) ("the more common
scenario" is that a party will "challenge[] only the extraterritorial reach of a statute without contesting
congressional authority to enact the statute.").
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
235. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
236. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
237. See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAw 40-63 (2012) (listing federal criminal laws that enjoy
express extraterritorial application).
238. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d 1185, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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the Court's decision that extraterritoriality is normally a merits question means
that persons who plead guilty or fail to timely object to the extraterritorial appli-
cation of a statute will waive that objection. Second, questions of jurisdiction are
decided by judges. Merits questions, however, may be deemed elements of an
offense that must be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of a jury. The important question of whether the geo-
graphical appropriateness of a prosecution is now such an element of federal
crimes has not yet been raised by courts or commentators. I believe it is.
The Constitution requires that the government bear the burden of proving each
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.240 Historically, "[m]ost
American jurisdictions have declined to apply that requirement to the proof of ev-
ery issue of fact in a criminal case."24 1 But there is, unfortunately, no generally
applicable test for what factual questions constitute elements of a crime, such that
the prosecution bears the burden of proving to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt,
those elements. In the 1970s, the Court rendered two decisions, Mullaney v.
Wilbur2 4 2 and Patterson v. New York, 24 3 in which it addressed the question of
when U.S. state statutes could shift the burden of persuasion on an issue to the de-
fendant. These opinions, however, are famously and infuriatingly unhelpful in
answering the question of what constitutes an element of an offense such that bur-
den shifting is inappropriate.
Other more recent cases concern not burden shifting, but rather the Court's em-
phatic reaffirmation that elements of crimes must be decided by juries, not judges.
In the sentencing context, the Court launched a revolution when, beginning with
Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 4 4 it insisted that what were formerly considered sen-
tencing factors that could be determined by a judge under a preponderance stand-
ard must in fact be treated as elements of the crime and proven to a jury's
satisfaction. The Court also restricted the extent to which Congress may dodge
the dictates of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right by reclassifying elements of
a crime into non-elements. As the Court cautioned in Harris v. United States,
"Congress may not manipulate the definition of a crime in a way that relieves the
Government of its constitutional obligations to charge each element in the indict-
ment, submit each element to the jury, and prove each element beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." 2 4 5 The Court also demonstrated its insistence on safeguarding
defendants' Sixth Amendment jury trial rights in United States v. Gaudin, ruling
240. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995).
241. Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1302-03 (1977).
242. See 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (invalidating a state statute requiring the defendant to prove
provocation as a defense to murder to reduce the crime to manslaughter).
243. See 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (without overruling Mullaney, upholding a statute requiring the
defendant to prove "extreme emotional disturbance" as a defense to murder to reduce the crime to
manslaughter).
244. See 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
245. See 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002).
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that even the issue of materiality, which had long been viewed as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact that judges could resolve, must go to the jury.246
The Apprendi line of cases establishes that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior con-
viction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum author-
ized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 47 This test,
which was crafted for evaluating what ought to be considered elements in the sen-
tencing context, may seem inapposite, but it is the best test available at present.
After Morrison, no penalty-let alone an enhanced one-may be lodged against
a defendant absent proof that the prosecution is geographically appropriate. It
may follow that the facts underlying the geographic scope of the crime should be
deemed elements.248
Two other lines of cases are instructive in determining whether the geographi-
cal appropriateness of a criminal prosecution is an element of the crime. Cases
concerning the status of venue determinations are superficially the most relevant
because they also concern whether a prosecution is geographically appropriate.
The circuits are split on whether proper venue-which is required by Article III
of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 24 9-is an element of a crime. 250 But
the predominant position appears to be that venue is an element of a crime, albeit
a lesser "jurisdictional" element rather than a "substantive" element going to
246. See 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995).
247. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
248. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(e), (10) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
249. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed .... ); id. amend. VI (providing right to speedy and public trial "by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
250. Compare United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Venue 'is not a
substantive element of a crime,' but instead 'is similar in nature to a jurisdictional element."' (citations
omitted)); United States v. Acosta-Gallardo, 656 F.3d 1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2011) ("' [V]enue ... has
been characterized as 'an element of every crime."" (quoting United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749
(10th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Although venue is a
right of constitutional dimension, and has been characterized as 'an element of every crime,' this court
and others have consistently treated venue differently from other, 'substantive' elements of a charged
offense." (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Venue is an element of any offense .... ); United States v. Massa, 686 F.2d 526, 527, 530 (7th Cir.
1982) ("Proof of venue is an essential element of the Government's case.... Although venue is an
essential element which the Government must prove, it is an element more akin to jurisdiction than to
the substantive elements of the crime."), with United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 77 (2d Cir. 2012)
("[T]he venue requirement, despite its constitutional pedigree, is not an element of a crime so as to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt ..... (internal quotations and citation omitted)); United States
v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Because it is not an element of the crime, the government
bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence"). Cf. United States v. Kaytso,
868 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1988) ("While venue presents a question of fact and must be proved by
the government, it is not an essential element of the offense." (emphasis added)); United States v.
Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1987) ("A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried in
the district in which the crime was committed; the burden of proving that a crime occurred in a
particular district is on the prosecution. The prosecution, however, does not have to prove where the
crime occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, since venue is not a substantive element of a crime. The
prosecution need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial is in the same district as a
part of the criminal offense." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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culpability.251 (In the language of the Model Penal Code, venue is an element but
not a "material" element.252 ) By this, the circuits do not mean that venue goes to
subject-matter jurisdiction. 25 3 Rather, they are referencing another line of cases
involving what are labeled as "jurisdictional" elements in federal criminal stat-
utes. These often establish Congress's Article I power to intrude into what other-
wise might be the domain of the U.S. states. For example, mail fraud requires
proof of a mailing because that statute was passed pursuant to Congress's postal
power; 254 by contrast, wire fraud requires proof of an interstate wiring because
that statute was passed pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power.255
Although courts recognize that these jurisdictional "hooks," like venue, do not go
to the defendant's culpability,256 the hooks are attendant circumstances that are
universally considered to be elements of the crime.2 57 In a jury trial, a conviction
cannot be successfully secured unless these jurisdictional hooks are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
By analogy to venue questions and these jurisdictional hooks, it seems likely
that at least the factual questions underlying extraterritoriality will be deemed an
element of the crime. As such, the geographical appropriateness of the prosecu-
tion must be pleaded in the indictment and proved to the satisfaction of a jury.
The only question is the applicable burden of proof. Venue is treated like an
element-even in those circuits that refuse to so label it-in that the government
251. As the Third Circuit explained in United States v. Perez:
When courts describe venue as an element, they often distinguish it from "substantive" or "essen-
tial" elements. The Fifth Circuit has explained that while venue is an element, it will be protected
less vigorously than other elements. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that while one
may call venue an element, "it is an element more akin to jurisdiction than to the substantive ele-
ments of the crime." Put another way, "[v]enue is wholly neutral; it is a question of procedure,
more than anything else, and it does not either prove or disprove the guilt of the accused."
280 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
252. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Am. LAW INST. 1962).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Venue is not
jurisdictional. .. .").
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985).
256. See, e.g., id. (the wire fraud statute's requirement of an interstate wiring "seems clearly to be
only jurisdictional. The interstate nature of the communication does not make the fraud more culpable.
Thus, whether or not a defendant knows or can foresee that a communication is interstate, the offense is
still every bit as grave in the moral sense."); see also United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1241
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the individual does not need to know that there was an "interstate nexus" to
be liable for a wire fraud transfer).
257. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2016) ("There is no question that the
Government in a Hobbs Act prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
engaged in conduct that satisfies the Act's commerce element. . . ."); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
339 (1971) (in a prosecution for possessing firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1), "the
Government must prove as an essential element of the offense that a possession, receipt, or transportation
was 'in commerce or affecting commerce"'); see also United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 679 (5th
Cir. 1982) ("In cases where the issue is directly addressed it has been uniformly held that the basis for
federal jurisdiction is an essential element of the offense.") (collecting court of appeals cases).
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bears the burden of proving appropriate venue. 258 And venue is uniformly
denominated a question of fact that should be decided by the jury,259 although it
may easily be waived if it is not "in issue." 260 But the circuits concur in holding
that venue, unlike the hooks described above, is subject only to a preponderance
standard261 even in those circuits that describe venue as an element of a crime.262
The geographical application of a statute is better treated like the hooks dis-
cussed above rather than venue for purposes of determining the applicable stand-
ard of proof. Venue is an odd duck because it is an overarching constitutional
requirement and any statutes dealing with venue are simply responsive to that
constitutional decree. The extraterritorial scope of a statute, however, is, like the
applicable jurisdictional hooks, a discrete statutory imperative. It is a statutorily
mandated attendant circumstance that is critical to a successful prosecution; a
conviction, and criminal penalty, should not be possible without the requisite
proof. For example, under Morrison (and before the Dodd-Frank Act complicated
the matter), a securities fraud conviction could not be obtained under the applica-
ble statutes absent proof that the relevant transaction occurred in the United
States. By analogy to these other statutory attendant circumstances, it seems
likely that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard will be applied to the question
of whether a given application of the statute is geographically appropriate.
It is unlikely that courts will ask juries to answer the legal question whether,
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, a given geoambiguous crimi-
nal statute has extraterritorial application. But, in light of the above, at least the
factual issues underlying extraterritoriality ought to be considered an element to
be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury. In cases where the statute is
held to have no extraterritorial application, juries should be tasked with determin-
ing whether the relevant conduct (identified by the focus test) occurred on U.S.
territory. And in cases in which the statute does apply extraterritorially, juries
should be charged with determining whether the statutory requisites are satisfied.
For example, if a statute states that it applies extraterritorially when the defendant
is a U.S. national or the criminal conduct occurred in whole or in part in the
United States, the jury should be required to make the findings of fact relevant to
that requirement.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v.
Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 77 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 636 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405,
412 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sitzmann, 74 F. Supp. 3d 96, 102-03 (D.D.C. 2014).
259. See, e.g., Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1120; Engle, 676 F.3d at 412-13; United States v. Acosta-
Gallardo, 656 F.3d 1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2011).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 330-35 (3d Cir. 2002).
261. Coplan, 703 F.3d at 77; Cameron, 699 F.3d at 636; Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1120; Engle, 676 F.3d
at 412.
262. See, e.g., Acosta-Gallardo, 656 F.3d at 1118; United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749-50
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Massa,
686 F.2d 526, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1982).
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D. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE QUESTIONABLE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF
CHARMING BETSY
Having resolved this threshold procedural question, we can now turn to the
ultimate question: where a federal statute is geoambiguous (as they usually are)
how should courts determine whether Congress intended the statute to apply
extraterritorially? The lower courts employ, without explanation, both the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality and a Charming Betsy inquiry. Thirteen years
after deciding Aramco263 and introducing the strong presumption against
extra(subjective)territoriality, the Court in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 264 applied the Charming Betsy canon instead of the presumption.
Does this mean that the Charming Betsy canon remains relevant? If so, what role
does it play?
My view is that the Court's most recent decisions render the Charming Betsy
canon-and its reference to all of the CIL prescriptive principles-unnecessary
and anachronistic, at least outside the antitrust area. In antitrust, an abbrevi-
ated Charming Betsy canon-which looks only to subjective and objective
territoriality-appears to be too entrenched in Supreme Court precedent and
in export cases-the FTAIA-to be displaced.
In the Court's most recent cases, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,265 Morrison
v. National Australia Bank,2 66 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2 67 and RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,26 8 it nowhere referenced the Charming
Betsy canon. What these precedents tell us is that, for the most part, the modem
Court has determined that the only relevant prescriptive principle is subjective
territorial jurisdiction and that the other principles do not matter.
The Court demonstrated this most clearly in its most recent extraterritoriality
decision, RJR Nabisco.269 In that case, the Court set forth its preferred order of
analysis. Courts should first determine whether a statute has any extraterritorial
application and, in doing so, must apply a strong presumption against extraterri-
toriality.27 0 Second, if the statute does not apply extraterritorially, courts must
"determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute,"
which it does "by looking to the statute's 'focus."' 271 The Court continued:
If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then
the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct
occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign
263. See 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
264. See 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
265. See 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
266. See 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
267. See 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
268. See 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 2101.
271. Id.
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country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.2 7 2
If the statutes does have extraterritorial effect, the RJR Nabisco Court
instructed that "[t]he scope of an extraterritorial statute ... turns on the limits
Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute's foreign application, and not on
the statute's 'focus."' 27 3 According to the Court, the lower courts need not answer
the question of where the crime took place when dealing with statutes with extra-
territorial effect because the statutory directions regarding extraterritoriality will
control. 27 4 For our purposes, the important point is that the Court, in explicitly
laying out these analytical steps, nowhere mentioned that the Charming Betsy
canon, and prescriptive principles other than subjective territoriality, might also
be applicable.
The logic of the RJR Nabisco analysis also renders the Charming Betsy canon
irrelevant. If a statute is deemed not to permit extraterritorial application, the
Charming Betsy canon has no work to do. Whether the extraterritorial application
of the statute could be justified, for example, by the protective or nationality prin-
ciples is irrelevant because the Court has decided that the statute only applies to
conduct within the territory of the United States. If the Charming Betsy canon is
to have any continuing relevance, then, it would only be in further restricting the
scope of statutes that are found to be extraterritorial. But the RJR Nabisco Court
instructed that if a statute does have extraterritorial applications, no further judi-
cial analysis is required-the statute applies extraterritorially by reference to its
own terms.2 7 5 In light of the strength of the presumption, any ambiguity in a stat-
ute will be grounds for a finding that it only applies within U.S. territory. Only if
Congress provides express instruction regarding extraterritorial applications can
the presumption be overcome. And where Congress has spoken, it is not material
what the CIL prescriptive principles provide; a statutory instruction will always
control, even if it constitutes a violation of CIL.2 76
In sum, the language and logic of the Supreme Court's recent cases dictate that
courts apply only the presumption against extraterritoriality in discerning con-
gressional intent. The Court's presumption presupposes that Congress does not
intend its legislation to have purchase outside the territorial United States unless
it affirmatively says so. Whether the extraterritorial application of a statute can be
justified by the effects, nationality, protective, or universal prescriptive principles
is irrelevant under the Court's recent case law. Accordingly, courts need not con-
tinue to consult the Charming Betsy canon of construction.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. The Court appears to be unaware, unfortunately, that some statutes' extraterritorial application
turns on whether the crime occurred in whole or in part in the United States, thus necessitating a "focus"
analysis. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(f) (money laundering), 2339B(d)(1)(D) (material support to
terrorist organizations), 2442(c)(4) (2012) (recruitment or use of child soldiers).
275. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
276. See supra note 80.
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IV. ANALYTICAL ROADMAP: CRIMINAL CASES
Having outlined the generally applicable analytical questions courts face when
determining whether federal statutes apply in transnational cases, we now turn to
two other issues that arise only in criminal cases.
A. THE QUESTIONABLE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF UNITED STATES V. BOWMAN
The Supreme Court has not recently decided an extraterritoriality challenge in
a criminal case but the lower federal courts have been very willing to find that
federal criminal statutes do apply extraterritorially. In fact, it has been relatively
rare for courts of appeals to apply the presumption and find that a criminal statute
does not apply extraterritorially.27 7
Most courts have avoided applying the presumption against extraterritoriality
by relying on the Supreme Court's 1922 opinion in United States v. Bowman.278
In Bowman, the defendants schemed on the high seas and in Rio de Janeiro to
defraud a U.S. government-owned corporation. The Court recognized that pun-
ishment of crimes against private individuals or their property "must of course be
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may
properly exercise it." 27 9 But, the Court explained,
[t]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes
which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the
Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpe-
trated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents. Some
such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are
277. For a few of the rare cases in which courts of appeals do apply the presumption, see, e.g., United
States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (RICO does not apply extraterritorially);
Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v.
Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22
C.F.R. § 129.3(a), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I), do not
apply extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2000)
(statute outlawing sexual abuse of a minor while within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), did not apply to offense committed on property leased by the
military in Germany); United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that crime of
receipt and possession of a destructive device made in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5822, 5861(c), applied only to devices made in the United States); see also United States v. Reeves,
62 M.J. 88, 92-93 (Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, did not apply
extraterritorially to American soldier's conduct in Germany); cf. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604
F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding no jurisdiction over the offense based on lack of prescriptive
jurisdiction under international law); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001-03 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1361, and related regulations did not
apply to an American citizen taking dolphins within the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign state);
Yenkichi Ito v. United States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1933) (crime of attempting to bring into the
United States persons not lawfully entitled to enter, 8 U.S.C. § 144, does not apply outside the territorial
waters of the United States).
278. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
279. Id. at 98.
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such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be
greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large
immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in
foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it neces-
sary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high
seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the
offense.2 8 0
The defendants on trial were Americans. With respect to the defendant who
was a national of Great Britain, the Court acknowledged that he had not yet been
apprehended and concluded that "it will be time enough to consider what, if any,
jurisdiction the District Court below has to punish him when he is brought to
trial." 281
The Court referenced the Charming Betsy canon when it stated that the scope
of the statute must be determined by the "jurisdiction of a government to punish
crime under the law of nations." 28 2 Although the Bowman Court did not explicitly
cite the protective principle of prescriptive jurisdiction, it justified the extraterri-
torial application of the statute by the "right of the Government to defend
itself." 28 3 The Court, then, appeared to have concluded that the protective princi-
ple justified this extraterritorial prosecution. The Harvard Research Study so
understood the case, discussing Bowman in its examination of that principle. 28 4 It
is also relevant that the Court discussed the citizenship of the defendants, hinting
that the nationality principle was in play.
The Bowman decision has never been overruled and is still frequently
employed by courts to justify the extraterritorial application of criminal statutes
without reference to, or despite, the presumption. 28 5 Bowman's permission to
280. Id.
281. Id. at 102-03.
282. Id. at 97-98.
283. Id. at 98.
284. Draft Convention, supra note 31, at 544-45.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 727 F.3d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ayesh,
702 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2012);
United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60,
66 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 813-14 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Delgado-
Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Liang, 224 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304-06 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833,
839 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Larsen,
952 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984); Chua Han Mow v. United
States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290-92 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cotten, 471
F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1972); Stegman
v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir.
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courts to disregard the presumption against extraterritoriality and focus instead
on whether the nature of the offense is such that extraterritoriality may be inferred
contains important limitations. It seems to apply, by its terms, only to geoambigu-
ous criminal statutes. And it applies only to a subset of criminal prohibitions that
are not logically dependent on their locality and are enacted to protect the govern-
ment "against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed
by its own citizens, officers or agents." 286 Given the Bowman Court's caveat
regarding the status of the British defendant, the rule may be limited to U.S. citi-
zens or agents of the U.S. government. As the Supreme Court summarized its
Bowman holding in Skiriotes v. Florida, "a criminal statute dealing with acts that
are directly injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without
regard to particular locality is to be construed as applicable to citizens of the
United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no
express declaration to that effect." 28 7
The lower courts have often ignored these limitations. First, they apply
Bowman to many cases not involving fraud or obstruction. 288 Some decisions,
such as those dealing with the murder of federal agents or corruption in connec-
tion with federal programs and perhaps immigration-related cases, may be justi-
fied to some extent under the protective principle.289 Other cases, concerning
offenses involving drug trafficking, violent crimes, and sexual offenses, do not
1967); United States v. Abu Khatallah, 151 F. Supp. 3d 116, 125-27 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v.
Carson, 2011 WL 7416975 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 97 (D.
D.C. 2012); United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300-01 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v.
Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 887 (C.D. Ill. 2011); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193-
97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see generally Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137
(2011); Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First
Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEwO L. REV. 585 (2007).
286. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
287. 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941) (emphasis added).
288. But see United States v. Martinelli, 62 MJ. 52, 57-58 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (in court martial,
proscriptions on possessing, downloading, and emailing child pornography did not apply
extraterritorially; refusing to apply Bowman in cases that do not involve "statutes punishing fraud or
obstructions against the United States Government"); United States v. Abu Khatallah, 151 F. Supp. 3d
116, 129 (D.D.C. 2015) (reading Bowman as satisfied when "(1) a federal criminal offense directly
harms the U.S. Government, and (2) enough foreseeable overseas applications existed at the time of a
statute's enactment (or most recent amendment) to warrant the inference that Congress both
contemplated and authorized prosecutions for extraterritorial acts"); United States v. Sidorenko, 102 F.
Supp. 3d 1124,1332 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding thatBowman did not apply to honest services wire fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 1343, or federal statute outlawing bribes in connection with a federal program, 18 U.S.C. §
666).
289. See, e.g., Ayesh, 702 F.3d at 166 (relying Bowman, statute proscribing theft of public money, 18
U.S.C. § 641, and committing acts affecting a personal financial interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), applied
extraterritorially); Siddiqui, 699 F.3d at 700-01 (relying on Bowman, statutes outlawing attempted
murder of, and assault on, U.S. agents, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 111, applied extraterritorially and statute
prohibiting use of a firearm during a violent crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), applied extraterritorially to the
extent that the violent crime does); Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (relying on Bowman analysis, statutes
prohibiting killing or attempting to kill an officer or employee of the United States, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1117, applied extraterritorially); Villanueva, 408 F.3d at 197-199 (relying on Bowman, statute
prohibiting smuggling aliens into the country, 18 U.S.C. § 1324(a), applied extraterritorially); Delgado-
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target the government as such, but rather are addressed to victimization of private
persons or the public at large.29 0 They would seem to be outside the scope of the
Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1343-44 (relying on Bowman, statute prohibiting conspiracies to induce aliens to
illegally enter the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), applied extraterritorially); Liang, 224 F.3d at 1060
(relying on Bowman, statute against attempted alien smuggling, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), applied
extraterritorially); Plummer, 221 F.3d at 1302-07 (applying Bowman, statute against attempted
smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act, applied extraterritorially);
Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204-05 (applying Bowman, accessory-after-the-fact statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3,
applied extraterritorially to case involving the murder of DEA agents abroad); Layton, 855 F.2d at 1395
(applying Bowman, statute outlawing conspiracy to kill a member of Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 351(d),
applied extraterritorially); Walczak, 783 F.2d at 854 (using Bowman, false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1001, in the context of false statements made to customs officials, applied extraterritorially); Benitez,
741 F.2d at 1316-17 (using Bowman, statutes proscribing assault upon, and attempted murder of, DEA
agents, 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114, 1117, and stealing their passports, 18 U.S.C. § 2112, applied
extraterritorially); Cotten, 471 F.2d at 749-51 (relying on Bowman, statute outlawing theft of
government property, 18 U.S.C. § 641, applied extraterritorially); Birch, 470 F.2d at 811 (applying
Bowman, statute proscribing forgery and false use of government documents, 18 U.S.C. § 499, applied
extraterritorially); Abu Khatallah, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 130-38 (relying on Bowman, statutes outlawing
murder and attempted murder of government agents, 18 U.S. § 1114, killing a person in the course of an
armed attack on a federal facility, 18 U.S.C. § 930(c), and the malicious damage of U.S. property
causing death, 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1), (3), applied extraterritorially; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use of a firearm
in the course of a violent crime) and § 2339A (material support) are ancillary crimes that apply
extraterritorially to the extent the underlying offenses do); Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 299-304
(applying Bowman, crime outlawing corruption in federal programs, 18 U.S.C. § 666, applied
extraterritorially); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 192-98 (relying in part on Bowman, crimes of using an
explosive to damage government property, killing in the course of an attack on a federal facility, and
destruction of national defense materials, 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (h), (n), 930(c), and 2155, applied
extraterritorially).
290. See, e.g., Lawrence, 727 F.3d at 395 (relying in part on Bowman, statute outlawing conspiracy
to possess illicit substance on aircraft, 21 U.S.C. § 963, applied extraterritorially); Weingarten, 632 F.3d
at 64-67 (relying on Bowman, crime of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. §
2423(b), applied extraterritorially); Belfast, 611 F.3d at 810-13 (relying on Bowman, torture statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2340A, applied extraterritorially); Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 799-800, 802 (relying on
Bowman, statute outlawing violent crimes in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, applied
extraterritorially); Frank, 599 F.3d at 1229-34 (relying on Bowman, statute outlawing traveling in
foreign commerce and promoting sexual conduct by a minor for purposes of visual depiction, 18 U.S.C.
§ 225 1A, applied extraterritorially); MacAllister, 160 F.3d at 1306-09 (relying on Bowman, conspiracy
to export cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 963, applied extraterritorially); Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839 & n.4
(relying on Bowman, statute penalizing violent racketeering crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, applied
extraterritorially); Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1329-30 (applying Bowman, crime of possession of child
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, applied extraterritorially); Larsen, 952 F.2d at 1100-01 (relying on
Bowman, statute prohibiting possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), applied extraterritorially); Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 167 (citing Bowman, drug statute, 21
U.S.C. § 955a(d)(1), applied extraterritorially); Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1311 (applying Bowman,
statute barring conspiracy to import drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 959, applied extraterritorially); Perez-Herrera,
610 F.2d at 290-92 (relying on Bowman, crime of attempt to import drugs into the United States, 21
U.S.C. § 963, applied extraterritorially); Baker, 609 F.2d at 137-39 (using Bowman, possession and
conspiracy to possess marijuana statutes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846, applied extraterritorially); Stegman,
425 F.2d at 986 (using Bowman to apply bankruptcy fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 152, extraterritorially);
Brulay, 383 F.2d at 350 (using Bowman, statutes governing conspiracy to smuggle drugs into the United
States, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 545, applied extraterritorially, even in absence of evidence that conspiracy was
formed in the United States or that an overt act was committed in the country); Carson, 2011 WL
7416975 at *6-8 (relying on Bowman, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), applied extraterritorially);
Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 887-88 (applying Bowman, Major Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) and wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, applied extraterritorially).
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Bowman ruling, but courts have nonetheless applied Bowman in many such cases.
Courts have also determined that application of the Bowman analysis is appropri-
ate regardless of whether the defendant is a U.S. national.29 1
Despite the Court's emphatic embrace of the presumption in its latest cases,
the lower courts have resisted applying it in criminal cases by taking the position
that Bowman applies until it is expressly overruled.292 In 2016, for example, the
Seventh Circuit refused, despite Morrison, to reverse a decision that relied upon
Bowman to hold that a federal criminal statute applied extraterritorially.29 3 Judge
Easterbrook explained that "[a] decision such as Bowman, holding that criminal
and civil laws differ with respect to extraterritorial application, is not affected by
yet another decision showing how things work on the civil side." 294 Are these
courts correct?
I believe the Supreme Court, should it have an opportunity to do so, will over-
rule Bowman and demand federal courts vigorously apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality in criminal cases. (As is discussed in Part VI, I believe
that this is the correct course, but not because of Bowman.) In its most recent
cases the Court has demonstrated a clear and unequivocal commitment to the pre-
sumption. 295 Bowman is obviously inconsistent with the modem Court's insist-
ence on a strong presumption against the application of statutes in any
circumstances other than where justified by the subjective territorial principle.
The protective and (perhaps) nationality principles upon which Bowman
appeared to turn were relevant under the Charming Betsy canon, but not under
the Court's narrowed presumption against extraterritoriality.
B. THE QUESTIONABLE RELEVANCE OF PASQUANTINO V. UNITED STATES
Those resisting the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in
criminal cases may argue, as is true, that the Court has never applied the presump-
tion in such cases. As the above historical survey proves, however, the Court has
abandoned its pre-1991 approach, and thus those precedents hold far less sway.
Those seeking to avoid the presumption may also cite the only criminal case in
which extraterritoriality arguably has been discussed by the Court post-Aramco:
291. See, e.g., Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1345-46; United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 11 (2d
Cir. 1968); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
292. See, e.g., Weingarten, 632 F.3d at 66 (acknowledging Morrison, but noting that under Bowman
"Congress is presumed to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes where the nature of the
crime does not depend on the locality of the defendants' acts and where restricting the statute to United
States territory would severely diminish the statute's effectiveness") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 799 ("Whether or not Aramco and other post-1922
decisions are in tension with Bowman, we must apply Bowman until the Justices themselves overrule
it."); Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 303 ("Despite the emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies 'in all cases,' recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with nary a
mention of Bowman and has predominately involved civil statutes.") (internal citation omitted); Carson,
2011 WL 7416975 at *7 ("Morrison does not mention Bowman, nor does it expressly overrule it.").
293. See United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 820 F.3d 899, 900-01 (7th Cir. 2016).
294. Id. at 901.
295. See supra notes 167-210 and accompanying text.
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Pasquantino v. United States.296 In that case, the Court did not apply a presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. But a careful consideration of the case will demon-
strate that the Court did not actually decide the question of whether the statute
applied extraterritoriality and thus presumption was irrelevant.
The defendants were indicted for wire fraud for carrying out a scheme to smug-
gle large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada, thereby depriv-
ing the Canadian government of the required excise taxes.297 The Court took the
case to decide whether the Canadian excise taxes could be considered "property"
under the wire fraud statute as charged in the indictment (they could), and
whether the common law revenue rule-which precludes enforcement of tax
liabilities of one sovereign in the courts of another-applied to bar the prosecu-
tion (it did not). 298 The question whether this was an extraterritorial application of
the wire fraud statute "was not pressed or passed upon below and was raised only
as an afterthought in petitioners' reply brief." 2 99
The best reading of Pasquantino is that the Court rejected the petitioner's argu-
ment by determining that this was a domestic, not an extraterritorial, application
of the wire fraud statute. The statute has only two elements: a scheme to defraud
and an interstate wiring in furtherance of that scheme.30 0 It does not require that
the scheme be consummated, that a discrete false statement be proven, or that
damage to the defendant ensue.301 The scheme was apparently hatched in the
United States. And the Court held that the offense "was complete the moment
[the defendants] executed the scheme inside the United States" through their
domestic, interstate use of the wires-that is, their use of a telephone in New
York to place orders with liquor stores in Maryland.3 0 2 The Court referred to the
defendants' use of U.S. interstate wires as the "domestic element of [their] con-
duct ... [that] the Government is punishing in this prosecution." 30 3
Granted, the case had significant transnational circumstances: The victim was
a foreign sovereign, the object of the fraud was the Canadian tax revenues due,
and the actual fraud concerned misrepresentations made to Canadian officials.
But none of these circumstances are elements of the crime. The Court focused on
where the elements of the crime occurred, determining that all of them (that is the
formation of a scheme to defraud and wirings in furtherance of that scheme) were
satisfied in the United States. When all elements of an offense take place in the
296. 544 U.S. 349 (2005). I do not consider Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) to qualify as
a criminal extraterritoriality precedent because the Court applied the presumption to the question of the
meaning of a statutory term in the domestic context, not to whether a statute applies to conduct abroad.
297. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 353.
298. Id. at 354-55, 359.
299. Id. at 371 n.12.
300. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
301. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (fraud statutes do not require proof of
reliance or damages and a completed fraud need not be shown); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
27 (1987) (fraud exists where there is concealment in the face of a duty to disclose).
302. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371.
303. Id.
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United States, the statute will be deemed to apply domestically, requiring no in-
quiry into the extraterritorial reach of the statute.304
The only difficulty with this characterization of Pasquantino is the Court's
cryptic concluding sentence: "In any event, the wire fraud statute punishes frauds
executed 'in interstate and foreign commerce,' so this is surely not a statute in
which Congress had only 'domestic concerns in mind."' 305 The modem Court
justifies its presumption against extraterritoriality in part by contending that
Congress "is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. "306 This, then, can
be read as a coded statement that extraterritorial applications of the statute are
appropriate. It is difficult to believe, however, that this one sentence represented a
holding that the wire fraud statute applies extraterritorially, although at least one
court has so read it. 3 0 7
The wire fraud statute is among the most frequently invoked statutes in the fed-
eral criminal code, so its scope is of more than passing interest. The issue of the
wire fraud statute's extraterritorial reach was not even fully briefed, much less
the subject of a decision below. And the Court has made clear in the past that
"even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of 'commerce' . . .
do not apply abroad." 3 08 Thus, the premise of this critical sentence-that the for-
eign commerce element was itself conclusive evidence of a congressional intent
that the statute apply extraterritorially-cannot be reconciled with precedent.
Finally, the presumption, which is so prominent in the Court's recent cases, was
not even mentioned, much less distinguished. My own view is that this throw
away was dicta. Pasquantino is best understood as a case in which the Court
determined that because all the elements of the crime occurred in the United
States, the prosecution was domestic-not extraterritorial-in nature.
304. See supra note 38.
305. 544 U.S. at 371-72 (quoting Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005)) (citation
omitted).
306. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090,
2100 (2016) (basing presumption against extraterritoriality on notion that "Congress generally legislates
with domestic concerns in mind"); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007);
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949).
307. See United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2015); cf. United States v. Lyons,
740 F.3d 702, 718 (1st Cir. 2014) (the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, applies extraterritorially). Other
courts, including the Second Circuit, have held to the contrary. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); United States
v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius, 251 F. Supp. 3d 82, 101-02 (D.D.C. 2017) (wire fraud not
extraterritorial); Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman, 199 F. Supp. 3d 768, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v.
Sidorenko, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409,
420 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 906 (C.D. Ill. 2011).
308. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262-63 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251
(1991)).
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C. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
Criminal defendants often raise due process objections to extraterritorial prose-
cutions.309 It is not uncommon, for example, for the United States to bring nar-
cotics prosecutions against foreign nationals seized from foreign-registered or
stateless vessels on the high seas,3 10 even when there is no evidence that the drugs
seized from the ships were intended for sale in the United States.311 Such persons
commonly object that prosecuting them under such circumstances violates due
process guarantees.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess limitations apply to extraterritorial applications of federal criminal law. We
know, however, that in civil cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that U.S.
states' extraterritorial application of their laws is subject to Fourteenth
Amendment due process scrutiny. With respect to such applications of U.S. state
law, the Fourteenth Amendment requires "a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is nei-
ther arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."3 12 Foreign defendants in civil cases can
also claim due process rights with respect to exercises of personal jurisdiction by
U.S. courts pursuant to state long-arm statutes.313 That said, criminal cases,
rightly or wrongly,314 have their own rules. For example, a criminal defendant
who is forcibly abducted while abroad and brought to trial in the United States
has no due process right to redress.315
The courts of appeals have found that Fifth Amendment due process limita-
tions on the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction exist but they are split
on what the applicable test is: whether due process only requires that the extrater-
ritorial prosecution not be arbitrary and unfair,316 or whether the Due Process
309. See U.S. CONST. amend V. See generally, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 2, at 1103-09; Colangelo,
supra note 19; Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992); A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal
Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379 (1997). Note that "[i]n regulatory
matters, the United States will base limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction on notions of comity
while, for transnational criminal matters, courts will apply limitations most commonly associated with
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, though suffused with international legal
considerations." Stigall, supra note 19, at 372.
310. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez,
776 F.2d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 1985).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 740 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.
1988); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982).
312. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930).
313. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,413-15 (1984).
314. See, e.g., Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication: The Promise of Extraterritorial Due
Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (2016).
315. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.
S. 655 (1992).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 2011) (using
"arbitrary and unfair" test); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1999) (adopting
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Clause also requires proof of a sufficient "nexus" between the defendant and the
United States.3 17 They also disagree about what the focus of the due process anal-
ysis should be and what sources should be consulted to resolve defendants' objec-
tions. The only apparent consensus lies in holdings that persons on stateless ships
have no due process rights, although it is not obvious why that is the case.318
Some courts have applied a nexus test that "serves the same purpose as the
'minimum contacts' test in personal jurisdiction. It ensures that a United States
court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who 'should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court' in this country."'319 This test appears to concern
whether a defendant could have contemplated that the United States has the
power to exert jurisdiction over the defendant. Other circuits appear to look for
real effects or consequences accruing in the United States before they find a
nexus.3 20 These two approaches may explain why some courts rely on interna-
tional law's prescriptive principles in addressing due process objections.321
Courts may believe these principles to be relevant in determining whether a de-
fendant had sufficient notice of the possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
as a guide to what conduct or effects provide a sufficient nexus to the United
States.
Still other circuits reject the analogy to minimum contacts standards, asserting
that "the law of personal jurisdiction is simply inapposite."3 2 2 "Fair warning does
not require that the defendants understand that they could be subject to criminal
"arbitrary and unfair" test and rejecting "nexus" test); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 202 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017)
("To satisfy the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the application of federal
and State statutes must be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.").
317. See, e.g., United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v.
Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App'x. 259, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56,
111-12 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
318. See, e.g., Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379; United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 371-73 (9th Cir. 1995).
319. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)); see also Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App'x. at
261-62; United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Shahani-
Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727-29 & n.13 (E.D. Va. 2003); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 309
(arguing that the extraterritorial Fifth Amendment due process test should mirror the minimum contacts
analysis used in civil cases, thus requiring a nexus between a criminal defendant and the United States).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) ("For non-citizens acting
entirely abroad, a jurisdictional nexus exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm inside the
United States or to U.S. citizens or interests."); Zakharov, 468 F.3d at 1177-78; United States v.
Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1998); Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257.
321. See, e.g., Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378-79 (referencing prescriptive principles to
determine whether prosecution would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair); Shi, 525 F.3d at 722-23
(referencing prescriptive principles to determine whether "nexus" exists); Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553
(referencing prescriptive principles to determine whether the prosecution is arbitrary or unfair); Davis,
905 F.2d at 248-49 & n.2 (applying nexus test and finding that international law prescriptive jurisdiction
principles provide a rough guide but do not control).
322. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Perez Oviedo,
281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing other circuits' rejection of nexus requirement for
jurisdiction).
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prosecution in the United States so long as they would reasonably understand that
their conduct was criminal and would subject them to prosecution some-
where."3 23 These courts focus on whether the defendant had notice of the substan-
tive law rather than of the power of the United States to impose that law on a
particular defendant.324 Courts that look to international treaties regulating certain
types of criminal activities (for example, against terrorist acts or trafficking in
persons) may believe that the treaties are relevant to this notice concern-that is,
whether defendants have sufficient notice that their conduct is subject to "univer-
sal condemnation.' 325
There is further uncertainty over whether defendants who are non-U.S. citizens
(as they often are, given the extraterritorial nature of these cases) can claim a U.S.
constitutional due process right to object to their prosecution. 326 Aliens within
U.S. territory are generally entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.3 27
Thus, "even aliens [in U.S. territory] shall not be held to answer for a capital or
other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 328 But the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee can-
not be claimed by enemy aliens tried abroad by U.S. authorities. 329 The Court has
also ruled that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a warrantless search of
the foreign property of a non-U.S. national who has no substantial and voluntary
relationship to the United States.3 30 The Court's precedents in this area are not
tidy; the applicable analysis appears to turn to some extent on the nature of the
323. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119.
324. See, e.g., Ali, 718 F.3d at 944 ("What appears to be the animating principle governing the due
process limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the idea that 'no man shall be held criminally responsible
for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."') (quoting Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)).
325. Ali, 718 F.3d at 945; see also Shi, 525 F.3d at 723; Perez Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 358; United States
v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
326. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 19; Colangelo, supra note 19, at 158-76; Jennifer K. Elsea,
Substantive Due Process and U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2077
(2014); Chimene I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 55 (2011); Hon. Karen Nelson
Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 845-77 (2013).
327. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896).
328. Id. at 238. Aliens within U.S. territory-whether or not they are lawfully present-can also
claim equal protection rights. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-15 (1982); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (resident
aliens have First Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492
(1931) (aliens in the United States can claim rights under Just Compensation Clause of Fifth
Amendment).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 290-91 (1990); see also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782-85 (1950) (Fifth Amendment does not apply to enemy aliens tried
abroad by U.S. authorities); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) (aliens cannot claim a
Fifth Amendment right against takings without just compensation for properties taken abroad by their
State).
330. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269-73.
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constitutional privilege at issue.331 It is fair to say, however, that two primary
determinants of defendants' rights to claim U.S. constitutional protections are the
nationality of the individual involved33 2 and the perceived site of the alleged con-
stitutional violation.3 33
The relevance of citizenship may be obvious, but the location of the violation
may take some explaining. "The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.
Although conduct by law enforcement officials [abroad] prior to trial may ulti-
mately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial" when the
compelled testimony is introduced into evidence in a U.S. courtroom.334
Although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly so held, lower courts have
ruled that the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, being
a trial right, should be claimable by alien defendants who made compelled state-
ments abroad but are on trial in the United States.3 35 By contrast, the Court has
held that the Fourth Amendment "prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation
of the Amendment is 'fully accomplished' at the time of an unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion." 3 36 Accordingly, when government agents conduct a search
overseas, the Fourth Amendment does not apply-at least if the person involved
is an alien with no substantial connection to the United States.
United States citizens can likely claim that the extraterritorial application of a
U.S. statute violates their due process rights but, given their obvious nexus to the
country and presumed knowledge of its law, they are unlikely to prevail. Aliens
raising the same claim can argue that the violation occurs when the criminal sanc-
tion is sought to be imposed on them in a U.S. court and may further claim that
331. Compare Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-66 (stressing text of the Fourth Amendment,
fact that search was conducted in Mexico, and fact that the defendant was a non-national) with
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766-71 (2008) (applying a multi-factor test).
332. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269-73; id. at 275-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
333. In Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, the Supreme Court held that aliens detained in a U.S. facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba could claim a constitutional habeas corpus right. But in the Insular Cases, the
Court held that not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity in U.S. territories,
even though the United States exercises sovereign power over them. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury
trial inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (Revenue Clauses of
Constitution inapplicable to Puerto Rico). In Eisentrager, the Court held that enemy aliens arrested in
China and imprisoned in Germany after World War II could not obtain writs of habeas corpus in U.S.
federal court on the ground that their convictions for war crimes had violated the Fifth Amendment and
other constitutional provisions. 339 U.S. at 781-85.
334. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (internal citations omitted).
335. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 199 (2d Cir. 2008).
336. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974)).
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their alien status exacerbates their injury rather than vitiating their rights.337 In
any case, U.S. citizens' and aliens' odds of succeeding on a due process claim are
vanishingly small: out of the hundreds of extraterritoriality cases I have read, I
have found only one case in which a due process challenge succeeded.3 38
V. A PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOES NOT MAKE SENSE IN CIVIL
CASES
Our roadmap reveals the extensive areas of confusion and uncertainty attend-
ing extraterritoriality analysis: How does one determine a statute's focus? If
Congress has provided a venue instruction for criminal cases, must a statutory
focus be identified? Is extraterritoriality an element of the crime that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury? Should courts continue to apply
the Charming Betsy canon of construction? Does the presumption apply in crimi-
nal cases? What is the status of Bowman? Is there a due process limit on extrater-
ritorial prosecutions, can it be invoked by non-U.S. nationals and, if so, what is
the applicable due process standard? All that is clear is that the Court wishes for
the lower courts to apply a strong-indeed case-determinative-presumption
against extraterritoriality, at least in civil cases. But does this presumption make
sense?
The Court's creation of a presumption founded only on subjective territoriality
in Aramco was a departure from the weight of precedent and a curious and unex-
plained throwback to early nineteenth century conceptions equating sovereignty
with subjective territoriality-conceptions that have been otherwise abandoned
as unworkable or undesirable in areas ranging from conflicts of laws339 to civil
procedure.34 0 The international community has long recognized that a State may
legitimately extend its jurisdiction beyond its borders where effects, nationality,
passive personality, protective, and universal jurisdictional principles permit.341
The United States has been famously aggressive in its extension of U.S. laws
abroad, employing one or more of these principles.34 2 The Court's insistence,
then, that congressional intent be measured only against subjective territorial ju-
risdiction, to the extent that it is grounded in antique notions of territorial sover-
eignty, is outmoded.
337. But see United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 267-68 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (alien defendant who
committed crime overseas has no Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in U.S. court martial).
338. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing on due process grounds), rev'd, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (reversing due process determination).
339. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sup.
CT. REv. 179, 189-98 (1991).
340. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
341. See Born, supra note 19, at 61 ("This century's profound international political, economic,
technological, and legal transformations have significantly undermined the strict territoriality
presumption that prevailed in the nineteenth century conceptions of public international law.").
342. See, e.g., supra note 43.
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What then justifies the presumption against extra(subjective)territoriality upon
which the modern Court is so insistent? Instead of adopting a default presump-
tion, why not use ordinary tools of construction-including reference to the poli-
cies the law was enacted to achieve-to answer extraterritoriality contests?343
The Court's explanation for why the presumption against extraterritoriality is
necessary has changed over time and includes three distinct rationales.
A. CONFLICT WITH FOREIGN LAW
Historically, the presumption, as well as the Charming Betsy canon,344 was jus-
tified as necessary "to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord."345 Where one
State seeks to enforce its laws on non-nationals who acted on another sovereign's
territory, there is potential for conflict and political repercussions.3 46 Overzealous
application of U.S. statutes overseas may provoke retaliation and impose other
costs.347 But I join most commentators in concluding that the conflict-avoidance
rationale is ultimately unpersuasive.
If the object is to create a presumption that mirrors Congress's intentions, it is
notable that Congress has not demonstrated a great concern about conflicts.
Conflict with other States is most likely when the United States is exercising
effects jurisdiction with respect to economic regulation.348 Yet Congress has
responded to the courts' reading of statutes regulating economic matters in im-
portant regulatory areas-including areas, such as antitrust and securities law
enforcement, most likely to generate international consternation-by expressly
endorsing the conduct-and-effects test. For example, Congress codified lower
courts' application of the conduct-and-effects test in antitrust cases relating to
export activity in the FTAIA.349 Congress responded to Morrison by amending
the jurisdictional provisions in various securities statutes with the evident inten-
tion of reinstating the conduct-and-effects test in government-initiated securities
fraud actions.350
This may well be because avoiding potential conflicts with other States is not
at the top of most politicians' list of priorities. As Professor Bom has argued, the
presumption against extraterritoriality "unduly elevates Congress's presumed
desire to avoid conflicts with foreign laws over other important legislative goals.
Much more important, in the real world, are legislators' desires to assist local
343. See Kramer, supra note 339, at 213.
344. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (discussing Court's
decision not to construe a congressional Act to violate the law of nations if an alternative exists).
345. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957).
346. See, e.g., Stigall, supra note 19, at 325-30.
347. See Parrish, supra note 2, at 1459 (discussing retaliation); id. at 1489-93 (discussing costs).
348. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 756.
349. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
350. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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constituencies, to further domestic legislative programs and interests, and to
make statements of political or moral principle."351
The modem Court's insistence on a presumption wedded only to subjective
territoriality is also patently overprotective if the aim is to avoid unnecessary
jurisdictional conflicts. As discussion of the Court's pre-1991 caselaw demon-
strates, the Court long thought that conflicts could be avoided if any of intema-
tional law's prescriptive principles justified extraterritorial applications of the
statute. It is only after 1991 that the Court determined that only subjective terri-
toriality could effectively prevent unnecessary clashes with foreign jurisdictions.
Where the United States is acting within the parameters of international law's
prescriptive principles in pursuing a prosecution, other States do not have much
basis for complaint, given that they, too, regularly employ these principles.
Indeed, the Court's exclusive focus on subjective territoriality ignores that con-
flict may eventuate even if U.S. statutes have no extraterritorial purchase. Many
States employ all the prescriptive principles, including effects jurisdiction and
expansive nationality and passive personality jurisdiction.352 Because other
States may, consistent with international law norms, apply their laws extraterrito-
rially-for example, to their own nationals even if those nationals are acting
on U.S. territory-the presumption may well be ineffective in preventing
conflicts.3 53
The modem presumption also overstates the degree to which the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws creates conflict. Most other States, for example, do
not seem to object to the U.S. enforcement priority that produces the greatest
number of extraterritorial convictions: prosecutions under U.S. anti-drug traffick-
ing laws.3 54 And although many States submitted amicus briefs in Morrison argu-
ing against allowing extraterritorial application of the civil securities fraud
provisions, one must recall that in RJR Nabisco it was the European Community
that sought damages in a civil RICO case based on U.S. companies' alleged activ-
ities abroad. In that case, the European Community aggressively fought to have
U.S. law apply overseas.
351. Bom, supra note 19, at 76; see also Dodge, supra note 2, at 116-17.
352. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 142.
353. See Clopton, supra note 19, at 12.
354. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) makes it a crime for persons, while on
U.S. vessels or "vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," to manufacture or distribute, or
possess with intent to manufacture of distribute, a controlled substance. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70503 (West
2016) (formerly 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) (2000)). The MDLEA states that a "'vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States' includes ... a vessel in the territorial waters of a foreign nation if the
nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States." Id. § 70502(c)(1)(E)
(2012). States regularly consent to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA. See, e.g., United States v.
Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 2009) (Bolivia consented); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d
158, 175 (2d Cir. 2002) (Canada consented); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir.
2002) (Panama consented); United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 2001) (Panama
consented); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552 (1st Cir. 1999) (Venezuela consented); United
States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1990) (United Kingdom consented); United States v.
Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (Panama consented).
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It is also notable that the Court draws no distinction in its application of the
presumption between cases in which the U.S. law would be applied to U.S.
nationals abroad as opposed to non-nationals. It is clear that there is far greater
potential for conflict in the latter cases than the former. And, although Congress
traditionally has been relatively reluctant to invoke nationality jurisdiction, it
does not seem reasonable to apply a global presumption that Congress is gener-
ally unconcerned with the conduct of its citizens-and government personnel-
overseas.355 If U.S. citizens' criminal actions abroad are presumptively immune
from the reach of federal criminal statutes, this can create the same political diffi-
culties and conflicts that the Supreme Court says it wishes to avoid, particularly if
the perpetrator returns to the United States and cannot-as is not uncommon-be
extradited.
Finally, the conflict-avoidance rationale carries with it a whiff of the disingenu-
ous. The Court does not actually inquire into the potential for international con-
flict in every case. Indeed, the Court has recognized that this concern does not
arise in all cases in which it chooses to apply the presumption.3 56 The Court has
applied the presumption in cases where it knew that no conflict was possible.357
And it has failed to apply the presumption where conflicts might well eventu-
ate.358 This imprecision is not costless. Where there is no potential for conflict,
application of the strong presumption may result in cases where no State's law
will apply to objectionable conduct (for example, in Antarctica359 and on U.S.
ships on the high seas360 ). And the Court's failure to apply U.S. law to situations
where other States' laws would not apply may actually create conflicts. For exam-
ple, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the Court refused to apply restric-
tions that Congress adopted to comply with U.S. treaty obligations to U.S.
personnel on a U.S. vessel on the high seas.361 This result disappointed, rather
than satisfied, some members of the international community.36 2
B. DOMESTIC CONCERNS
Most recently, the Court has relied on a different rationale, that "Congress ordi-
narily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters."363 This rationale
fails for two reasons.
355. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 2, at 383-84.
356. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174
(1993); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993).
357. See Sale, 509 U.S. 155, 173-74, Smith, 507 U.S. 197, 203-05.
358. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993); see also supra notes
152-57.
359. Smith, 507 U.S. at 203-05.
360. Sale, 509 U.S. 173-74.
361. Id. at 159.
362. See Knox, supra note 2, at 382 & n.200.
363. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55
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First, one must, in light of current conditions, question the fundamental
assumption here-that is, that Congress ordinarily is concerned only with U.S.
domestic matters. This may have been true in 1991 when the modem presumption
was created. But, especially in the criminal sphere, it is doubtful that Congress is
concerned only with conduct occurring on U.S. soil given the explosion in cross-
border criminality.3 64
Second, and more fundamentally, the Supreme Court's limitation of its defini-
tion of "domestic matters" solely to conduct in U.S. territory does not reflect real-
ity.365 Even if one assumes that Congress is only concerned with circumstances
affecting the territory of the United States, "[f]oreign actions can and often do
affect conditions within U.S. borders so that, at least under certain conditions,
legislation must address foreign conduct in order to regulate domestic con-
cems." 366 Congress knows conduct that occurs abroad may often have concrete
and seriously pernicious effects in U.S. territory and on the voting public. Its con-
cem in this regard is demonstrated by Congress's repeated overruling of judicial
efforts to limit the geographic reach of statutes to conduct occurring within U.S.
territory and its endorsement of the conduct-and-effects test.367 Indeed, Professor
Dodge makes a persuasive case that Congress is primarily concerned with domes-
tic effects and thus the presumption should not apply at all when such effects are
present.36 8
C. LEGISLATIVE EFFICIENCY
The third modern rationale for the Court's strong presumption is the belief that
Congress knows the Court will employ the presumption where a statute is geoam-
biguous: Congress "legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against
extraterritoriality." 3 6 9 This, the Court asserts, "preserv[es] a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects." 37 0 This rationale
is questionable first because it is factually inaccurate. As discussed above, the
strong presumption against extraterritoriality tied only to subjective territorial ju-
risdiction has been the "stable background" against which the Court assumes
Congress has acted for only the last twenty-five years. Many of the statutes whose
geographical scope is being tested were enacted before 1990.
(2007); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
364. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 2, at 657-59.
365. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 19, at 15.
366. Knox, supra note 2, at 384.
367. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (Dodd-Frank and Morrison). Congress also
overruled Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, by amending Title VII to extend protection to U.S. citizens employed
abroad. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012)) ("With respect to employment in a foreign country," the term
"employee" includes "an individual who is a citizen of the United States.").
368. See Dodge, supra note 2, at 118-19.
369. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197, 204 (1993).
370. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
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Second, the implicit assumption underlying this rationale is that the presump-
tion is value neutral and that, like "driving a car on the right-hand side of the
road," it "is not so important to choose the best convention as it is to choose one
convention and stick to it."37 1 Professor Eskridge has demonstrated that this ra-
tionale cannot withstand scrutiny. To justify the presumption against extraterri-
toriality on this basis, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) Congress must be
"institutionally capable of knowing and working from an interpretive regime that
the Court is institutionally capable of devising and transmitting in coherent
form," (2) the application of the interpretive regime must be "transparent" to
Congress, and (3) the interpretive regime "should not change in unpredictable
ways."3 7 2 Professor Eskridge rightly concludes that although the presumption
established in Aramco3 73 could perhaps be said to satisfy the first condition, it
failed the second, and "dramatically flunk[ed]" the third.37 4 And Professor
Eskridge is not alone; many question whether the presumption is sufficiently
transparent, coherent, and consistently applied to be a useful guide to
Congress.37 5
Finally, no one is obviously advantaged by a decision to drive on the right side
of the road as opposed to the left side. The presumption against extraterritoriality,
however, is not similarly value neutral.37 6 The presumption advantages those,
like transnational companies, who prefer that regulations be as limited in geo-
graphic scope as possible. The presumption works to their advantage because it
puts the heavy burden of persuading Congress to overrule the Court's geographic
limitation on advocates of regulation.377 Many commentators believe that, in
view of these allocational effects, the presumption simply reflects the Court's
normative commitment to traditional territorial sovereignty or its distaste for cer-
tain types of regulation.37 8 Contemporary evidence of such distaste may be found
in Morrison in which Justice Scalia asserted that one should be "repulsed" by the
potential adverse consequences of a contrary ruling.379
D. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A fourth rationale for the presumption comes from academia. Professor
Bradley asserts that "the determination of whether and how to apply federal legis-
lation to conduct abroad raises difficult and sensitive policy questions that tend to
fall outside both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of
371. WLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (1994).
372. Id. at 278.
373. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
374. ESKRIDGE, supra note 371, at 278.
375. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 2, at 388-96.
376. ESKRIDGE, supra note 371, at 279.
377. Dodge, supra note 2, at 122-23; see also Turley, supra note 2, at 661-62.
378. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 371, at 283; Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 17.
379. 561 U.S. 247,270 (2010).
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the judiciary."380 One difficulty with this argument is that it assumes its conclu-
sion-that is, that Congress actually has a default intention with respect to geo-
ambiguous statutes, that the intention is to limit their application to U.S. soil, and
that the Court must honor this intention. But "in the vast majority of cases, legis-
latures have no actual intent on [extra]territorial reach." 38 1 Given that the pre-
sumption is supposed to apply when actual congressional intent is absent-or
ambiguous-"by definition it is ambiguous whether applying the statute territori-
ally or extraterritorially would be the 'activist' position."382 And one may legiti-
mately question whether the presumption, which "always sacrific[es] legislative
aims in order to avoid conflicts with foreign law," is truly the best way to limit ju-
dicial intrusion.383 In sum, as Professor Dodge has argued,
[A] court attempting to carry out congressional intent should apply a statute
extraterritorially whenever doing so would advance the domestic purposes that
Congress sought to achieve with the statute. To constrain the extraterritorial
application of a statute on the basis of a court's intuition that conflict with for-
eign law is undesirable is-to borrow a phrase-judicial activism.384
Congress can "correct" the Court's mistaken limitation of the scope of a geo-
ambiguous statute, but the reverse is true as well. Professor Dodge queries
whether the Court should apply a presumption designed to "force Congress to
380. Bradley, supra note 2, at 516; see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090,
2100 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,455 (2007); F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165
(2004). Arguably this rationale encompasses two concerns: judicial interference with the executive's
conduct of foreign policy, and judicial meddling with congressional prerogatives in determining the
scope of federal statutes. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Cents. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993). In
criminal cases, there is no legitimate concern over interference with executive prerogatives because it is,
of course, the executive who determines whether to launch a given case. The Department of Justice's
own policies reflect that it recognizes the sensitivity of transnational prosecutions and applies increased
scrutiny to their appropriateness. For example, only money laundering prosecutions that involve
extraterritorial application of the relevant statutes require Main Justice approval. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Offices of the United States Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-105.300(1) (2007).
381. Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392, 393
(1980). As Judge Friendly acknowledged in the securities context in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
"[t]he Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of the depression could
hardly have been expected to foresee the development of offshore funds thirty years later . . . Our
conclusions rest on ... our best judgment as to what Congress would have wished if these problems had
occurred to it." 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d
659, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1998); Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Comms., Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904-05 (5th
Cir. 1997) (describing the court's task of determining jurisdiction as "'fill[ing] the void' created by a
combination of congressional silence and the growth of international commerce since the Exchange Act
was passed") (quoting MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990)); Cont'l
Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that its
decision "in favor of finding subject matter jurisdiction is largely based upon policy considerations"); SEC
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that "it should be recognized that this case in a large
measure calls for a policy decision").
382. Clopton, supra note 19, at 16.
383. Dodge, supra note 2, at 120.
384. Id.
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reveal its preferences by adopting a rule that Congress would not want," noting
that this argument seems strongly counter-majoritarian and contrary to separation
of powers.3 85 Finally, "if the presumption is intended to respect the decisions of
the political branches-legislative and executive-it needs work."386 The
strength of the modem presumption is such that courts have rejected the views of
the executive branch departments or agencies that interpret and apply the statutes
at issue.38 7 Similarly, the Court's insistence that congressional intent to apply fed-
eral law overseas must be clear means that it consistently finds less crystalline
indicators to be insufficient, thus arguably foiling Congress's actual intention.3 88
The above survey demonstrates that none of the rationales for the modem pre-
sumption convincingly justify its use, at least in civil cases. In particular, the pri-
mary justification for the presumption rests on the assumption that Congress
always wishes to avoid potential jurisdictional conflicts with other States. We
know, based on history, that this is incorrect. If this were truly the goal, it would
make more sense to employ the Charming Betsy canon and test statutes against
all the prescriptive principles. Only when a given geographical expansion of a
statute's scope cannot be justified by the international law principles to which all
States adhere could another sovereign have a legitimate objection to a jurisdic-
tional conflict.
The exclusive focus on territorial conduct is neither necessary nor particularly
sensible in a world in which much of modern communication and commerce is
conducted digitally, "in the air," so to speak, rather than in a specific geographic
location.389 The pernicious effects of the conduct may well be the primary evil
that a cause of action or criminal prohibition seeks to address, and it therefore
makes sense that a "territorial" analysis identifying the location of effects is just
as relevant as conduct. 3 90 Returning to the hypothetical with which this Article
began, the site of the computer hackers' keyboard or the relevant server farm
seems to be less important than the fact that the cybercrime was intended to
affect, and did affect, the functioning of vital networks, such as the British Health
Service. In many circumstances, the site of the conduct ought not trump the place
of the effects in sorting out appropriate criminal jurisdiction.
My own view is that it makes sense to revert to the Court's historical practice
of (1) determining, with reference to normal canons of statutory interpretation,
the appropriate geographical scope of a statute in light of the statute's policy
385. Id.
386. Clopton, supra note 19, at 17.
387. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010); EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991); Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d
835, 846 (9th Cir. 2012).
388. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 372, at 282.
389. See Buxbaum, supra note 42, at 631-36, 673-74.
390. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 2, at 118; Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in
Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 594 (1961)
("Often the evil is more the consequence of the activity than the activity itself.").
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objectives and (2) applying the Charming Betsy canon as a means of determining
whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute would offend international law and
thereby give other States a real reason for grievance. One advantage of this
approach is that it can be justified as consistent with congressional expectations.
Much of geoambiguous legislation was enacted prior to 1991 and, in most cases,
Congress probably had no intention at all with respect to the geographical scope
of the statute. Prior to 1991, the Court often adopted the interpretative approach I
have suggested. Granted, the Court did not invariably do so and thus its prece-
dents may not pass Professor Eskridge's test with flying colors. But it certainly
makes more sense than applying the post-1991 presumption against anything
other than subjective territoriality to discern Congress's intention in passing legis-
lation from 1818 through 1990.
VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY OUGHT TO APPLY TO CRIMINAL AND
HYBRID STATUTES TO OPERATIONALIZE THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE AND SEPARATION OF
POWERs REQUIREMENTS
In the Third Restatement, the American Law Institute appeared to recognize
that, in criminal cases, an elevated standard should be applied to test whether a
given statute applies extraterritorially.39 1 And some courts have questioned
whether the same interpretive rules ought to apply in civil and criminal cases in
reliance on United States v. Bowman.3 92 The majority view, however, is that the
same interpretive rules apply for purposes of both public and private enforce-
ment.393 The scholarly literature on the presumption also assumes that there is no
distinction between its wisdom in criminal and civil cases other than that in crimi-
nal cases separation of powers concerns relating to judicial intrusion on executive
prerogatives are not as great, given that the executive launches prosecutions.3 94
The tentative draft of the Fourth Restatement disclaims any difference between
civil and criminal cases. 3 95 However, I believe that there are fundamental differ-
ences between civil and criminal enforcement such that criminal (and hybrid)
391. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("[I]n the case of regulatory statutes that may give rise to both civil and criminal
liability, such as United States antitrust and securities laws, the presence of substantial foreign elements
will ordinarily weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject
conduct outside the state's territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis of express
statement or clear implication.").
392. See supra notes 17, 292-95 and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1997); see
also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 reporters'
note 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
394. But see Clopton, supra note 19 (arguing that civil, criminal, and administrative law statutes
should be treated differently).
395. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, March 21, 2016); id. § 203 reporters' note 4 (Tentative Draft
No. 3 2017) ("Unless a contrary congressional intent appears, the geographic scope of a statute is the
same for the purposes of both public and private enforcement.").
1088 [Vol. 106:1021
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FED. CRIM. STATUTEs
statutes demand application of the presumption, whereas-as argued above-
civil cases do not.
It is inarguable that a number of doctrines employed regularly in transnational
civil litigation do not apply in the criminal sphere:
Neither civil nor common law systems appear to apply the doctrine of forum
non conveniens or lis alibi pendens to criminal cases, and there is no clear
authority that the doctrine of "comity," which "counsels voluntary forbearance
when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a
second sovereign also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of
international law," applies generally in the criminal context.396
Conflicts principles are inapplicable because U.S. courts may not apply foreign
criminal statutes in domestic courts or enforce foreign criminal judgments.3 97 In
response to constitutional imperatives surrounding venue, Congress and the
courts have decreed where criminal violations are "committed" so the Morrison
"focus" test is (in my view) irrelevant in criminal cases.
Perhaps these differences are not pertinent to assessments of whether a pre-
sumption should apply. What are relevant, however, are foundational separation
of powers and legality principles that are central in criminal adjudication but that
are not applicable in civil cases. These principles dictate that the applicable can-
ons of construction in civil and criminal cases must be different. In criminal but
not civil cases, the rule of lenity and the void-for-vagueness doctrines apply. The
Chevron doctrine also arguably does not apply in criminal cases, although this
has not been authoritatively settled.3 98
Our constitutional scheme mandates that the power to define criminal offenses
and prescribe criminal punishment "resides wholly with the Congress."399
According to the Supreme Court, federal crimes "are solely creatures of stat-
ute"40: there are no federal common law crimes.401 The prohibition on common
law making in the criminal realm is founded in a number of basic principles-
separation of powers being one. "Enlightenment theoreticians decreed that liberty
is most secure where political power is fractured and separated."402 It would be a
dangerous concentration of power for life tenured judges to both propound the
396. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 168 n. 119 (quoting Nippon, 190 F.3d at 8-9).
397. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 422(1),
483, & reporters' note 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
398. See, e.g., Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Esquival-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J.,
dissenting), rev'don other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
399. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
400. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
401. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
402. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 202 (1985) (criticizing rule of strict construction because it does not serve stated goals); see
also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1994). But see
generally Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998).
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law and to preside over its interpretation and administration. More fundamen-
tally, "[a]s the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature
could validate the surrender of individual freedom necessary to formation of the
social contract." 4 0 3
The bar on judicial crime-creation is also founded on the first principle of crim-
inal law-the principle of legality-which outlaws the retroactive definition of
criminal offenses.4
It is condemned because it is retroactive and also because it is judicial-that
is, accomplished by an institution not recognized as politically competent to
define crime. Thus, a fuller statement of the legality ideal would be that it
stands for the desirability in principle of advance legislative specification of
criminal misconduct. 05
One of the ways the legality principle is operationalized is through the rule of
strict construction, often referred to as the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity
requires that "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before [the Court chooses] the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that
is clear and definite." 4 06 The rule is founded first on notice concerns: "a fair wam-
ing should be given to the world in language that the common world will under-
stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the
warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." 4 07 Second, legitimacy
concerns reflected in separation of powers principles justify lenity. "[B]ecause of
the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity." 4 08 "Lenity promotes th[e] conception of legisla-
tive supremacy not just by preventing courts from covertly undermining legisla-
tive decisions, but also by forcing Congress to shoulder the entire burden of
criminal lawmaking even when it prefers to cede some part of that task to
courts."4 0 9
The other arm of the legality principle is the due process vagueness doctrine,
which "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment." 4 10 "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
403. Jeffries, supra note 402, at 202.
404. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
405. Jeffries, supra note 402, at 190.
406. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
407. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
408. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
409. Kahan, supra note 402, at 350.
410. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."4 11 The vagueness doctrine's "connection to legality is obvious: a law whose
meaning can only be guessed at remits the actual task of defining criminal mis-
conduct to retroactive judicial decision making."4 1 2
The legality principle and its foot soldier, the rule of lenity, should be applica-
ble to geoambiguous statutes. As discussed above, I believe that at least the fac-
tual circumstances underlying extraterritoriality, as a "merits" question, must
now be considered an element of the crime charged. Where there is ambiguity
regarding this element, the rule of lenity requires that it be resolved in the defend-
ant's favor-that is, the statute should not be applied extraterritorially.
Some might argue that the vagueness doctrine may also be applicable. Courts
have not been explicit in distinguishing vagueness from ambiguity in criminal
cases, but the distinction is important in terms of remedy. The Supreme Court
sometimes undertakes, under the rubric of the rule of lenity, to fix ambiguous stat-
utes rather than to strike them as violations of due process and send them back for
legislative definition, as it would vague statutes. A rule is vague when the statute
defines "not a neatly bounded class but a distribution about a central norm."413
Ambiguity presents a more limited problem and is present when a term or phrase
has two competing applications or connotations, and the Court is tasked with
selecting the most defense-favorable application under the rule of lenity.414 In my
view, the issue of the extraterritorial application of a statute implicates ambiguity
because it can generally be resolved with a yes or no answer, but courts may con-
clude that vagueness is also implicated.
This analysis is complicated by the fact that a number of important statutes that
have abundant potential transborder applications are hybrids-that is, they can be
enforced both civilly and criminally. The rule of lenity and the vagueness doc-
trine generally are not employed in construing civil statutes where concerns about
notice and legislative supremacy do not have the same sway. The Court has occa-
sionally held that where a statute is capable of both civil and criminal enforce-
ment, lenity ought to be applied,415 but it has not done so in extraterritoriality
cases concerning hybrid statutes. "Absent a clear indication to the contrary, U.S.
courts have construed the geographic scope of such statutes to be the same in
each context."4 1 6
411. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
412. Jeffries, supra note 402, at 196.
413. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 441 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2004).
414. Id.
415. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc.,
537 U.S. 393, 408-09 (2003); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-18 (1992)
(plurality opinion); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.
S. 284, 296 (1954). But see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
704 n.18 (1995). See generally Jonathan Marx, How to Construe a Hybrid Statute, 93 VA. L. REV. 235
(2007); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory
Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1025.
416. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, March 21, 2016).
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Where hybrid statutes are at issue, the extraterritoriality question should not
hinge on the happenstance of whether the first case to raise the issue before the
Supreme Court involved a civil or criminal application of the statute. In the ab-
sence of another means of ensuring that Congress defines the relevant criminal
prohibition in a way that provides advance notice to defendants, the presumption
against extraterritoriality serves much the same function: it requires Congress to
specify, in advance, the extraterritorial application of a statute. The presumption,
then, should be applied to test the extraterritoriality of both criminal and hybrid
statutes as a means of respecting the legality principle and as a proxy for the rule
of lenity.
Some courts have responded to "notice" concerns through a due process analy-
sis, which normally comes at the conclusion of the analytical roadmap traced
above. My view is that relegating this issue to due process analysis is a mistake
for at least three reasons.
The first is, in part, unabashedly instrumental. Many aliens are the subjects of
transnational criminal prosecutions and there is a real question of whether they
can claim due process rights. I, for one, do not understand why foreign corpora-
tions can claim due process rights in civil cases-and thus are able to contest a
U.S. state court's choice of law417 or demand that minimum contacts with the
United States sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements be demon-
strated4 1 8-but individual (alien) criminal defendants whose liberty is at stake
may not.4 19
Some contend that "it may be logically awkward for a defendant to rely on
what could be characterized as an extraterritorial application of the U.S.
Constitution in an effort to block the extraterritorial application of U.S. law." 4 2 0
But I believe that it is far more awkward to assert jurisdiction to put a foreign
national in a U.S. jail for conduct committed wholly outside the United States,
while not affording that defendant even minimal constitutional protections. In
this, I am with Justice Brennan in believing that an alien should be entitled to due
process protection:
[O]ur Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him accounta-
ble under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a member of our
community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has become, quite literally,
one of the governed. Fundamental fairness and the ideals underlying our Bill
417. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930) (Fourteenth Amendment protections
"extend[] to aliens" in choice of law dispute).
418. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,413 (1984).
419. See GSS Group Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139 (D.D.C. 2011) ("It is not clear
why foreign defendants, other than foreign sovereigns, should be able to avoid the jurisdiction of United
States courts by invoking the Due Process Clause when it is established in other contexts that
nonresident aliens without connections to the United States typically do not have rights under the United
States Constitution."), aff d, 680 F.3d 805, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
420. Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 338; see
also United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradley).
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of Rights compel the conclusion that when we impose "societal obligations,"
such as the obligation to comply with our criminal laws, on foreign nationals,
we in turn are obliged to respect certain correlative rights .... If we expect ali-
ens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our
Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."2 1
In any case, notice concerns in this context should not be considered "only"
individual due process rights. Rather, they are based on structural constitutional
considerations and foundational principles of criminal law and thus should be
met without regard to the individual at issue.
Second, when courts answer the notice question in the due process context,
they consult the wrong sources. Instead of focusing on whether defendants had
notice of the content and applicability of U.S. law, they instead reference intema-
tional law sources. 4 22 I do not think it appropriate to task individual defendants
with effective notice of the international law governing prescriptive principles or
the content of treaties that require State parties to criminalize defined conduct.
The Second Restatement explained that prescriptive jurisdiction principles deter-
mine "whether the action of a state in prescribing or enforcing its laws gives to
another state a claim for violation of its rights."4 23 The Third Restatement also
noted that "[i]ntemational law deals with the propriety of the exercises of juris-
diction by a state, and the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between states. "424
These principles are not designed, then, to control the actions of individuals. And,
at least in the United States, it is generally recognized that international law does
not create rights for, or impose obligations on, individuals. Treaties, in particular,
are covenants that concern only the States party to them and do not generally cre-
ate rights enforceable by "third-party" individuals.4 25 As a matter of equity, it
seems questionable to hold that individuals are largely irrelevant to treaties and
most norms of international law but that those same individuals are somehow on
notice that they may be haled into criminal court by virtue of the content of inter-
national law. Unless these dictates are embodied in domestically-binding law,
they do not serve to give effective notice.
Third, and most important, these notice related doctrines do not respond to
lenity's imperative that only Congress has the legitimacy to dictate the content
of criminal norms. Justice Scalia made this point in a dissent from denial of
421. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal
citation omitted).
422. See supra notes 321-25.
423. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Part I, Intro.
Note (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. § 8 ("Action by a state in prescribing or enforcing a rule that it
does not have jurisdiction to prescribe or jurisdiction to enforce, is a violation of international law,
giving rise to a claim....").
424. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 101 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
425. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008).
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certiorari in Whitman v. United States.426 Whitman concerned a related issue-
whether the Chevron doctrine's deference to administrative agencies ought to
apply to statutes that have criminal application. The question presented, in Justice
Scalia's view, was: "Does a court owe deference to an executive agency's inter-
pretation of a law that contemplates both criminal and administrative enforce-
ment?" 4 27 His emphatic view was that it does not.
Justice Scalia cited a number of cases in which the Court had held that, where
a hybrid statute is at issue, the rule of lenity ought to be applied even in civil
cases. 4 28 He then sought to distinguish a footnote in the one case that rejected his
view, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Greater Oregon.429
That footnote stated that the regulation at issue was clear enough to fulfill the rule
of lenity's purpose of providing "fair warning" to would-be-violators.43 0 Justice
Scalia, however, correctly argued that even if the rule of lenity's purpose of pro-
viding fair warning to would-be-violators were satisfied, "that is not the only
function performed by the rule of lenity; equally important, it vindicates the prin-
ciple that only the legislature may define crimes and fix punishments. Congress
cannot, through ambiguity, effectively leave that function to the courts-much
less to the administrative bureaucracy."431
VII. A PLEA TO CONGRESS
As detailed above, there is no convincing reason for a general presumption
against extraterritoriality in civil cases. It is appropriate to apply such a presump-
tion in cases implicating criminal and hybrid statutes in service of the legality
principle and as a surrogate for the rule of lenity. The status quo in the courts,
then, makes no sense: the presumption is applied where it should not be and is
ignored where it is required. Add to that the additional uncertainties and questions
arising out of existing case law detailed above, and what we have is an increas-
ingly vital area of the law that requires immediate attention. Most of the relevant
scholarship exhorts the courts to attend to this mess. My belief is that attempting
to sort out all these issues through statute-by-statute litigation is both patently
inefficient and unfair to the litigants who cannot know whether their conduct was
actually illegal until the Supreme Court decides their cases.
This wasteful and unfair litigation is also unnecessary because Congress can
resolve so many of these issues through comprehensive legislation. Congress
need not revise each statute to make its wishes clear regarding what circumstan-
ces, if any, warrant its extraterritorial application. Instead, Congress can create a
general code section that instructs courts about the geographic scope of particular
426. 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).
427. Id. at 353.
428. See supra note 415.
429. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
430. Id. at 704 n.18.
431. Whitman, 135 S. Ct. at 354 (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95
(1820)).
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statutes or particular types of statutes. This is not pie-in-the-sky: other States
have such a code provision. 432 The work can begin by referencing the extraterri-
toriality provision drafted as part of a (failed) effort to revise the entire criminal
code.4 33 This draft requires updating, but much can be learned from a comprehen-
sive analysis of the statutes in which Congress has expressly indicated its inten-
tions with respect to extraterritoriality. Such an analysis may yield a taxonomy of
the types of prohibitions that Congress believes warrant expansive geographical
application.
Congress should also comprehensively address the "where" question-that is,
what it deems a territorial or domestic application of a statute as opposed to an
extraterritorial one. In criminal cases in which Congress has provided directions
regarding venue-evidencing where it thinks the crime was "committed"-
courts ought to ignore the Court's focus test and instead rely on the venue provi-
sion. Many statutes, however, do not expressly address venue. With respect to
such statutes, Congress should consider creating a generally applicable provision
that makes known its wishes in this respect. Again, this is not an impossible
dream. The Model Penal Code has just such a provision.434 And the relevant lan-
guage included in the Dodd-Frank Act may provide a start.
CONCLUSION
The lower courts are daily faced with the task of determining where a crime
that has transnational elements was committed, and whether federal criminal stat-
utes apply to extraterritorial conduct. The Supreme Court relatively recently
articulated a focus test for determining where a crime was committed for these
purposes. Although it may be too soon to tell, this test appears to be subjective
and manipulable and thus may require revisiting. The Court has provided clearer
direction with respect to the extraterritorial application of federal statutes in the
last decade. It mandates that unless a statute clearly provides that it applies to
conduct outside the territory of the United States, it does not. The Court's recent
cases demonstrate that the Court has abandoned its traditional reliance on the
Charming Betsy canon. This change has important implications in criminal cases
because it likely means that the lower courts are wrong to rely so heavily on
United States v. Bowman 4 35 to escape the presumption against extraterritoriality
in criminal cases.
432. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], §§ 5-7, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englischtstgb/englischstgb.html [https://perma.cc/Y7UF-8AQ6] (Ger.); Schweizerisches
Zivilgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311, arts. 4-7, translation at https://www.
admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19370083/201701010000/311.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WGM-
EGCE] (Switz.).
433. See generally, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981); William A. Gillon, Note,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Codes: Senate Bill 1630 and House
Bill 1647, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 305 (1982).
434. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
435. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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From a normative point of view, although there is no convincing case for
applying a strong presumption against extraterritoriality in civil cases, founda-
tional principles of criminal law require a different result in the criminal sphere.
Because the geographic appropriateness of criminal prosecution should be a
treated as an element of the offense, ambiguity with respect to this element should
be resolved in the defendant's favor. A strong presumption against extraterritor-
iality ought to apply where criminal or hybrid statutes' extraterritorial reach is at
issue as a surrogate for the principle of legality and the rule of lenity. The current
state of affairs-in which courts apply a strong presumption against extraterritor-
iality in civil cases but largely decline to do so in criminal cases based on
Bowman-is obviously wrongheaded. Congress ought to act promptly to enact a
general provision that provides uniform guidance on these questions in criminal
matters.
